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TAKING STOCK OF DETAINER STATUTES
by Larry W. Yackle*
A detainer is a warrant or hold-order placed on a person already in
custody to insure that the prisoner, upon completion of the term he is
serving, will be available to the authority which filed the detainer.
While penal and correctional methods and philosophies have moved
far along the road of progress, this system has persistently and imper-
turbably plagued penal administrators, courts, and institutional person-
nel. Unnumbered times a detainer has proved the stumbling block to a
law violator on his way to recovery.'
I. INTRODUCTION
To the outside world detainers are largely unknown. But behind
the walls of American prisons they plague inmate and turnkey alike,
and only recently has the legal system taken serious note of the situ-
ation.2 While the detainer system affects most severely the inmates in-
volved, detainers pose problems for correctional administrators' and
the judiciary4 as well. Recently, the Center for Criminal Justice at
the Harvard Law School conducted an extensive investigation of the
detainer system, as it exists in Massachusetts. 5 The Harvard study
identified four types of detainers: (1) detainers based upon outstand-
ing criminal charges pending against the inmate; (2) detainers based
upon sentences already imposed but to be served after the completion
of the inmate's present sentence; (3) detainers based upon parole or
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Univer-
sity of Kansas; LL.M. 1974, Harvard University. The writer would like to thank James
Vorenberg and D. Lloyd Macdonald of the Harvard Center for the Advancement of
Criminal Justice for their comments on an early draft of this Article.
1. This Issue in Brief, 9 Frm. PRonATiON, July-Sept., 1945, at 1.
2. The first published account of the detainer system appeared in 1945, when a lead-
ing sociological journal devoted almost an entire issue to it. Id.
3. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 FED. PRoBATION, July-
Sept., 1945, at 8.
4. Perry, Effects of Detainers on Sentencing Policies, 9 FED. PROBATION, July-Sept,,
1945, at 11; see Reed v. Ciccone, 342 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
5. Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CRnM. L. BuLL. 669
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Dauber]; see also L. Wenzell, Detainers: A National Survey
and the Right to a Speedy Trial, Apr., 1969 (unpublished thesis in the Northwestern
University Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as WenzellJ.
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probation revocation warrants; (4) detainers based upon miscellaneous
legal proceedings." By far the most significant detainers are those in
the first category, those representing pending prosecutions. Nearly
half the detainers examined by the Harvard researchers were of that
type. 7 Indeed, of the approximately 23,700 detainers on file nation-
wide in 1969, sixty-nine percent were based upon outstanding criminal
charges.8 Not only are such detainers more common than those in the
other three categories, but they present much more difficult problems
for inmates, penal authorities, and the criminal justice system. Accord-
ingly, this Article will be concerned only with detainers based upon un-
tried charges.'
In recent years a body of literature has developed, examining de-
tainers and appraising their effect upon inmates and the criminal
justice system as a whole. 10 This Article will inquire into the relation-
ship between the detainer system and the constitutional right to a speedy
trial. Specifically, the Article will examine the uniform statutes that
have been promulgated to deal with the problems associated with de-
tainers. The thesis is that the detainer statutes were designed to re-
solve the administrative difficulties surrounding detainers, ignoring the
constitutional implications. In view of the development of the right to
a speedy trial in judicial decisions and legislative enactments, the con-
stitutionality of the detainer statutes is questionable. The concluding
section of this Article will propose remedial legislation to bring the pro-
cedure for handling outstanding charges pending against prison in-
mates into line with ordinary criminal process.
A. Uses of Detainers
Generally, a penal institution will recognize a detainer lodged by
6. Dauber, supra note 5, at 676.
7. Id. at 677.
8. Wenzell, supra note 5, at 3-4.
9. Detainers in the fourth category are limited in number and can, in most cases, be
handled fairly and efficiently through administrative channels. Consecutive sentence
and parole or probation revocation detainers pose the fundamental question of the extent
to which an offender can or should be punished by incarceration. That issue will not
be explored here. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE,
STAiDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND ?ROCEDURES § 2.1(d) (Ap-
proved Draft 1968) (suggesting that in most cases the maximum authorized term for
a single offense should be five years).
10. E.g., Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (1948) [hereinafter cited as The Detainer]; Note, Detainers and
the Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417 [hereinafter cited as Detainers].
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any person who has authority to take the inmate into custody.11 In
most instances, the prosecutor charged with the task of bringing the
case to disposition files the detainer,"2 but, if the case has not yet
reached the stage of formal indictment or information, the detainer
may be filed by the police'3 or the county sheriff.14 In such cases, the
detainer rests upon an arrest warrant,'; a complaint,' 6 or the mere
desire on the part of the filing authority to interrogate the inmate17
It is hardly surprising, then, that little information about the under-
lying charge accompanies a detainer to the penal institution where the
inmate is held. Detainers based upon process short of indictment or
information lack even the reliability due a probable cause determina-
tion by a grand jury or inferior court.
18
The problem is compounded by filing authorities' practice of lodg-
ing detainers with little consideration of whether or not the inmate will
eventually be brought to trial. As the Harvard study pointed out,
"[t]his is the detainer with the most uncertainty-it may never be
acted upon or may be executed within days, weeks, years, or at the
very end of the inmate's present sentence."' 9 Indeed, only approxi-
mately half the detainers lodged against prison inmates are eventually
acted upon.20 In some cases, the filing authority may determine that
further prosecution of the inmate is unwarranted and withdraw its de-
tainer as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. In many instances, how-
11. Detainers, supra note 10, at 417-18.
12. E.g., State v. Moore, 506 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1973), vacated, per curiam, 414 U.S.
25 (1973).
13. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1972).
14. E.g., Morris v. McGee, 180 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1970).
15. E.g., Dodge v. People, 495 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1972).
16. E.g., State v. Otero, 502 P.2d 763 (Kan. 1972).
17. Comment, The Convict's Right to a Speedy Trial, 61 J. Crum. L.C. & P.S. 352,
353 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Convict's Right].
18. An arrest warrant must also be supported by probable cause, but typically a war-
rant issued prior to a preliminary hearing or grand jury action is less persuasive evidence
that the inmate is seriously sought by the filing authority for trial on the underlying
charge. An Iowa statute attempts to solve the problem by requiring that detainers based
upon a complaint or arrest warrant must be followed up within six months by indictment
or information. IowA CoDE ANN. § 247.5 (1969).
19. Dauber, supra note 5, at 677.
20. Wenzell, supra note 5, at 12-13. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said,
in Huston v. Kansas, 390 F.2d 156, 157 (10th Cir. 1968), that "[it is also common
knowledge that relatively few detainers on federal inmates are followed by prosecution."
Occasionally, a prosecutor can be forced to commit himself. Eg., Taylor v. Virginia,
353 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Va. 1973) (federal habeas corpus relief granted when prose-
cutor declined to bring inmate to trial).
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ever, detainers are maintained even when the filing authority has no
intention of bringing about trial. 1 Accordingly, prison inmates may
suffer the consequences of detainers that will never be executed, for,
whether or not filing authorities take detainers seriously, penal author-
ities invariably do.
Even if a prosecutor intends to follow up a detainer with trial at
some future date, he has ample reasons for delay. A detainer lodged
against a potential defendant is a convenient short-term disposition of
a pending case, operating to keep the prosecutor's books straight and
his time free to handle other cases. 22  The prosecutor knows where the
defendant is and knows that he cannot reach and prey upon the public
during the period before trial. Thus a primary purpose of immediate
action in a criminal ease is mooted. 23 So long as the prosecutor is
confident that his case will not become stale, and therefore less likely
to bring a conviction, he may be content to adopt a waiting posture.
B. Effects of Detainers
A prison inmate against whom a detainer is lodged may suffer dire
consequences within the penal institution where he is confined. A de-
tainer represents the possibility of further prosecution and punishment
at the end of the inmate's present term. Apparently on the theory that
such a threat may prompt an inmate to attempt escape,24 penal au-
thorities often assign high custody classifications to inmates with de-
tainersY An inmate with a detainer may be denied institutional priv-
ileges resulting in decreased freedom of movement26 and may be ex-
cluded from preferred living quarters such as dormitories.2 7  Perhaps
more importantly, such an inmate may be denied "trusty" status2 s or
21. Jacob & Sharma, Justice After TriaL" Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the
Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REv. 493, 581-82 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Jacob & Sharma]. See Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in
Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.. 767, 772-73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Effective
Guaranty].
22. See United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
23. Comment, The Detainer System and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. CM. L.
REv. 535, 540 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Detainer System].
24. Dauber, supra note 5, at 692; but see Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and
the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. CIa. L. REv. 179, 181 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Schindler] (indicating that other factors such as the probability of escape are not con-
sidered).
25. Schindler, supra note 24, at 181.
26. Jacob & Sharma, supra note 21, at 583.
27. Id.
28. The Detainer, supra note 10, at 1192.
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may be considered ineligible to reside at an "honor farm"29 or to take
part in a "furlough" program 0  Detainers may also be taken into
account by parole boards and, therefore, may directly affect the length
of an inmate's present term of imprisonment.3 1  The effect of a de-
tainer on a parole board's decision-making process varies among the
states. 2 Although most boards view the existence of a detainer as a
legitimate consideration, few take the position that a detainer is a bar
to parole.13  The most significant effect of a detainer upon a prison
inmate is psychological, for, as one author pointed out,
[t]he strain of having to serve a sentence with the uncertain prospect of
being taken into the custody of another state at the conclusion interferes
with -the prisoner's ability to take maximum advantage of his institu-
tional opportunities. His anxiety and depression may leave him with
little inclination toward self-improvement. 3
4
Thus a detainer may frustrate one of the arguable purposes of in-
carceration-rehabilitation.
A prison inmate may, as a result of a detainer lodged against him
and the delay associated with it, suffer prejudice in the preparation
of his defense. While the government has ample opportunity to in-
vestigata the case and to develop evidence, 5 the inmate in all prob-
ability is not represented by counsel.3 6 Left to his own devices, the
inmate may be unable to ascertain the nature of the charge and the
surrounding circumstances.
Detainers not only cause difficulties for the inmates against whom
they are lodged, but also pose problems that go to the core of the crim-
inal justice system. First, inasmuch as a detainer has detrimental ef-
fects on the inmate before he is convicted of any new offense, one of
the fundamental tenets of the system-the presumption of innocence-
is put in jeopardy.37  Second, prosecutorial delay in following up a
29. Schindler, supra note 24, at 181.
30. Detainer System, supra note 23, at 537; see Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp.
708, 713-14 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
31. Dauber, supra note 5, at 693-94; see United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney,
194 F. Supp. 154 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
32. R. DAwsoN, SENTENCiNG 283 (1969).
33. Wenzell, supra note 5, at 16.
34. Bennett, "The Last Full Ounce," 23 FED. PROBATION, June, 1959, at 20-21 [here-
inafter cited as Bennett].
35. Schindler, supra note 24, at 182.
36. See generally Jacob & Sharma, aupra note 21.
37. Schindler, supra note 24, at 183. In order to make an inmate's sentence a little
easier to bear, one commentator has argued that
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detainer with trial on the underlying charge amounts to a usurpation
of the court's sentencing power .3  While it is true that a prosecutor
makes daily decisions that affect the sentence a defendant is likely
to receive upon conviction, his decision to delay an inmate's trial until
the court no longer has the option to impose a concurrent sentence is
something apart from what normally is considered proper use of dis-
cretion. Third, a prosecutor may scuttle the program of penal author-
ities by lodging a nuisance detainer. It has already been said that
correctional institutions tend to accept a detainer at face value and
that the effects that flow from it may be substantial. 9 Consequently,
a prosecutor can see to it that an inmate is punished quite severely,
even though he cannot be convicted of another offense. The filing of
detainers that will be withdrawn just before the inmate's term expires
apparently is not uncommon.40 Quite clearly, however, the practice
is an abuse of criminal process spawned by the detainer system.
11. THE DETAINER STATUTES
Various law reform groups have grappled with the detainer system
and attempted to devise remedial administrative procedures and leg-
islation to deal fairly and effectively with the problems that arise when
a prison inmate faces an outstanding criminal charge. In a series
of meetings held in 1955 and 1956, a committee of the Council of
State Governments developed drafts of proposed legislation to deal
with detainer matters. Two of the drafts were published in 1957 as
part of the Council's suggested legislation for that year.41 One of the
proposals was revised slightly by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and published as the Uniform Man-
datory Disposition of Detainers Act.42 The Uniform Act was intended
to govern a criminal prosecution pending against an inmate in the ju-
[i]n light of the important interest of the accused in a speedy trial, and since de-
tainers have significant custodial effects, a prisoner subject to a detainer based on
an outstanding charge should be given credit against any subsequent sentence that
is based on that charge from the date of the filing of the detainer to the date of
sentence.
Schomhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time,
23 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1086 (1972).
38. State v. Milner, 149 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery Co. 1958).
39. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
40. Bennett, supra note 34, at 21.
41. COUNcIL OF STATE GovmonnmENTs, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1957, at 77 (1956).
42. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. (Supp. 1962); see also CouNciL OF STATE GovERN-
MENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PRoGRAM FOP 1959 at 167 (1958).
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risdiction where he is confined. The Act, or a similar statute, is now
part of the law of at least six states.4 3  The other proposal, entitled
the Agreement on Detainers, was designed to deal comprehensively with
the perplexing problems that arise when an outstanding charge is pend-
ing in another jurisdiction. The Agreement was approved by the Amer-
ican Bar Association in 1962 4 and now has been enacted by at least
forty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government."
These two statutes are the primary subject matter of this Article. It
will be argued that they raise serious constitutional questions that can
only be resolved by remedial legislation.
A. The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act
According to the Council of State Governments, "[t]he basic pur-
pose of the [uniform] act is to afford -a means of permitting a prisoner
43. Letter from Leslie B. Turner, Administrative Assistant, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to the author, Apr. 9, 1974. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1381 (West 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-23-1-39-23-8 (Supp. 1969);
IDAHO CODE §§ 19-5001-19-5008 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4301-22-4308
(Cum. Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.292 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.080-
.150 (1962).
44. Resolution on the Agreement on Detainers, adopted by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association in San Francisco, Aug. 6-10, 1962.
45. Letter from William L. Frederick, Director of the Criminal Justice Project of the
Council of State Governments, to the author, October 23, 1973. See Auz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31-481 (Supp. 1974), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-3201 (Cum. Supp. 1973); CAL,
PENAL CODE § 1389 (West 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 74-17-1 (Supp. 1969);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-186 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2540-2550
(Supp. 1970); D.C. CODB ENCYCL. ANN. § 24-701 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 941.45 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 77-50lb-77-510b (1973); HAWA REV.
STAT. § 714-1 (1968); IDnO CODE § 19-5001 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1003-8-9 (Smith-Hurd 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 11-1-7-1 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 759A.1 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4401 (Cun. Supp. 1972); ME. Rnv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, §§ 1411-1419 (Supp. 1973); AID. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-616J (1971);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276 App., § 1-1 (1972); MIcE. STAT. ANN. § 4.147(1)
(1969); MWNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.294 (1974); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 222.160 (1974);
MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 95-3131 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-759 (1964);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 606-A:1 (1973 Supp.); N.J. Rnv. STAT. § 2A:159A-1 (1971);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-20-19 (1972); N.Y. CRIm. PRO. LAW § 580.20 (McKinney 1971);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-89 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-34-01 (1974); On. REv.
STAT. § 135.775 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1431 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-
221 (Supp. 1973); S.D. CODE § 23-24A-1 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3901
(Supp. 1974); 18 App. U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-4 (Supp. 1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1501 (1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-304.1 (1972); WAsH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9.100.010 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-14-1 (Supp. 1974);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 976.05 (1971); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.9 (Supp. 1973).
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to clear up detainers which have been lodged against him."4 The in-
tent was to provide a mechanism by which an inmate can relieve him-
self of the burdens accompanying a detainer by prompting prosecution
authorities to bring about a resolution of the underlying charge. As
mentioned, the Act applies only if the outstanding charge is pending in
the jurisdiction where the inmate is held.47 The Act requires the official
having custody of an inmate to promptly inform the prisoner of any
untried criminal charges pending against him of which the custodian
becomes aware. A prisoner who wishes to clear up an outstanding
charge may request final disposition by delivering to the custodian a
written request, addressed to both the court in which the prosecution
is pending and the prosecuting officer who has responsibility for the
case. The custodian must forthwith prepare a certificate explaining the
inmate's status and must send copies of the request and the certifi-
cate to the court and the prosecutor to whom the request is addressed. 48
The prosecutor has ninety days after receipt of the request and certifi-
cate within which to bring the inmate to trial.49  The court may grant
a continuance on a showing of good cause made in open court with
the inmate or his counsel present.50 If the inmate is not brought to
trial within ninety days (and no valid continuance is granted), the Act
46. CoUNcIL oF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1959, at 167 (1958). See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLA-
TION PROGRAM FOR 1957, at 76-77 (1956), where a note introducing the Council's first
draft of an Intrastate Detainer Statute further explained its purpose as follows:
It [the statute] gives him [the inmate] no greater opportunity to escape just con-
victions, but it does provide a way for him to test the substantiality of detainers
placed against him and to secure final judgment on any indictments, informations
or complaints outstanding against him in the state. The result is to permit the pris-
oner to secure a greater degree of knowledge of his own future and to make it pos-
sible for the prison authorities to provide better plans and programs for his treat-
ment.
Id. at 76-77.
47. State v. Brann, 292 A.2d 173, 177 n.5 (Me. 1972). Similarly, the Act does not
apply to an outstanding state charge pending against a federal prisoner, even if the in-
mate is held in a federal institution in the state where the prosecution is pending. State
v. Morton, 436 P.2d 382 (Kan. 1968); Commonwealth v. Wagner, 289 A.2d 210 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1972).
48. If the prisoner addresses his request to the wrong prosecutor or court, or conceiv-
ably if the custodian misdirects the request, the Act will not be properly invoked and
the prisoner may suffer the consequences. Brimer v. State, 402 P.2d 789 (Kan. 1965)
(prisoner not entitled to relief because request delivered to wrong court).
49. Some states have adopted longer time periods. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4303
(Supp. 1972) (180 days); see State v. Goetz, 353 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1960).
50. See Chambers v. District Court, 504 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1972) (trial after 90 days
had elapsed not barred because defense counsel agreed to the date at preliminary hear-
ing).
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withdraws the court's jurisdiction to entertain the case." The indict-
ment or information automatically loses force or effect, and the court
must dismiss the prosecution with prejudice. 2
B. The Agreement on Detainers
When the outstanding criminal charge underlying a detainer lodged
against a prison inmate is pending in a different jurisdiction, difficult
questions regarding comity between governmental units are pre-
sented.53 Clearly, one state has no power to compel another state to
deliver up a prison inmate for prosecution.5 4  Nor can a state require
the federal government to grant temporary custody of a federal prisoner
to state officers, so that the inmate may be brought to trial in state
court. 5 Similarly, a federal court cannot compel a state to give up
custody of a state prisoner in order that he may be tried for a federal
offense.56 Thus disposition of the underlying charge must come
51. Thus the Act imposes a self-executing sanction. Commonwealth v. Bell, 276 A.2d
834 (Pa. 1971) (applying the Pennsylvania variant of the Act which sets a time period
of 180 days); see also Commonwealth v. Klimek, 206 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1965).
52. State v. Goetz, 353 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1960).
53. See generally The Detainer, supra note 10.
54. This is true notwithstanding article four of the Constitution:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. In Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860),
the Supreme Court held that Congress has no power to compel the governor of a state
to perform his moral duty under the Constitution and, therefore, declined to enforce ei-
ther the constitutional provision or the implementing statute, leaving state executives de
facto discretion to refuse delivery of a prisoner in appropriate circumstances. Kopel-
man, Extradition and Rendition, 14 B.U.L. REv. 591, 633-34 (1934); Note, Interstate
Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 YALE L.J. 97 (1956).
55. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); cf. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312 (1926); but see McTyre v. Pearson, 435 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971) (noting that the Attorney General usually recognizes and
honors writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by state courts).
56. Cf. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). Bollman held that, under
the version of the federal habeas corpus statute then in effect, the federal government
could not interfere with state process once it had attached. Since Bollman, the habeas
corpus statute has been amended so that it now permits a federal writ of habeas cor-
pus to run against state process. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970). Still, there must
be some constitutional violation -to bring section 2241 into play. Clearly, habeas corpus
cannot be used to seize a prisoner from lawful state custody solely for the purpose of
trial on an outstanding federal indictment. See Detainer System, supra note 23, at 539.
In such a situation, it may be argued that the state is violating the prisoner's right to
a speedy trial. However, the argument is quite weak inasmuch as the duty to bring
about trial lies with the federal government and not with the state.
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through the cooperation of the jurisdictions affected.57  The Agreement
on Detainers is a legislative attempt to achieve just that cooperation.
58
"The Agreement on Detainers applies the same principles embodied
in the intrastate act to the interstate field." 59  Rather than deal with
particular cases on an ad hoc basis with special contracts,6" the Agree-
ment purports to establish a general scheme for handling most cases
swiftly and efficiently. The Agreement is organized into nine articles,
the first,"' third, fourth, and fifth of which are the most significant. 2
Article III of the Agreement establishes an inmate's right to initiate
the process by which a detainer and the underlying charge may be re-
solved. The person having custody of the inmate must promptly in-
form him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against
his release.63  The custodian must also inform the inmate of his right
57. Although the states may not be compelled to deliver up fugitives on demand, it
is clear that they are free to devise schemes for voluntary rendition. Dean, The Inter-
state Compact-A Device for Crime Repression, 1 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 460, 466-
68 (1934). Indeed, most states have enacted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
see 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 263-355 (1957), in order to settle the potential procedural
problems involved. Similarly, the federal government has power to cooperate voluntarily
with state authorities in order that a federal prisoner may be brought to trial in state
court. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922). In point of fact, the Congress
has expressly approved such cooperation by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 4085(a) (1970).
58. Success in the attempt to achieve this sought-after interjurisdictional cooperation
may depend upon the adoption of the Agreement by the states which, thus far, have
declined to do so. Most states which have faced the question have held that the Agree-
ment is operative only when both states involved are members of the compact. E.g.,
State v. Endres, 482 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1972) (prisoner not entitled to invoke the Agree-
ment because receiving state not a compact member); State v. Cox, 505 P.2d 360 (Ore.
Ct. App. 1973) (prisoner not entitled to invoke the Agreement because the sending state
-the federal government-not a compact member); compare People v. Winfrey, 228
N.E.2d 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1967) (state required to seek temporary cus-
tody of inmate even though sending state not a member of the compact).
59. COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNmENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1957, at 78-85 (1956).
60. E.g., Teets v. West Virginia, 322 F. Supp. 695 (N.D.W. Va. 1971); Morris v.
McGee, 180 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1970).
61. Article I sets forth the purpose of the Agreement:
[lit is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage
the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the
proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations
or complaints.
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS art. I.
62. Article II is the definition article. The term state is defined to include the United
States and the District of Columbia. Article II further identifies the state where the
prisoner is confined as the sending state and the state where the charge is pending as
the receiving state.
63. Significantly, if a detainer is not lodged, the Agreement does not come into play.
The Agreement imposes a duty on the custodian to notify the inmate of a charge out-
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to request final disposition of the charge upon which the detainer is
based. Upon receipt of a request, the custodian must promptly for-
ward it to the appropriate prosecutor and court in the receiving state.64
The request must be accompanied by a certificate similar to that pre-
scribed in the Uniform Act.
The prisoner's written request has a number of effects. First, once
the receiving state prosecutor and court receive the request, Article M
imposes a duty on the receiving state to bring the inmate to trial within
one hundred-eighty days. A continuance may be granted only upon a
showing of good cause in open court with the inmate or his attorney
present. 65
Second, the request for disposition of any charge in the receiving
state operates as a request for disposition of all outstanding charges
pending there, which are represented by detainers lodged against the
inmate. If other detainers representing other pending prosecutions
have been filed, the custodian must notify all appropriate prosecutors
and courts of the inmate's request and must enclose with the notice
copies of the request and the certificate. Then, while the inmate is
in their jurisdiction, those prosecutors must act to bring him to trial on
the charges for which they have responsibility. If trial is not had on
such a charge prior to the prisoner's return to the sending state, the
standing against him only if the charge is represented by a detainer.
64. In People v. Esposito, 238 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Queens Co. Ct. 1960), the court said:
Under the law [the Agreement]-and with the guidance of the Warden-the
prisoner has to do but one thing. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(b) of article IH of the agreement his notice and request "shall be given or sent
by the prisoner to the warden.. . or other official having custody of him." Other-
wise, the burden of compliance with the requirements of the agreement is placed
entirely upon the respective officials involved.
Id. at 467; but see State v. Brockington, 215 A.2d 362 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1965) (demand
on prosecutor alone insufficient to set Agreement machinery in motion).
Nevertheless, the express language of Article IT puts the burden on the prisoner to
see that the correct prosecutor and court are notified. Such a burden seems unduly
heavy in light of the obvious difficulties inmates experience in communicating by mail.
E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (censorship); Hart v. State, 225 N.E.2d
676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (prisoner sent request to wrong court). Moreover, it is simply
unfair to hold the prisoner responsible for notifying the proper receiving state authorities
when he must funnel his request through the custodian. Accordingly, in Esposito the
court held that, if the custodian fails in his statutory duty to send the proper documents
to the appropriate receiving state authorities, the adverse consequences should be visited
upon the prosecution rather than the prisoner. 238 N.Y.S.2d at 468. See Pittman v.
State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973); but see Baker v. Schubin, 339 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct.
1972) (prisoner held responsible for custodian's failure to send notice to prosecutor).
65. But see Commonwealth v. Martin, 282 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1971) (good-faith plea bar-
gaining permitted delay beyond 180 days).
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charge loses force or effect, and the court with jurisdiction of it must
dismiss the case with prejudice.
Third, the request waives extradition for purposes of serving any
future sentence imposed upon the inmate. Thus a prisoner who sets
in motion the Agreements machinery by making a request under Article
I simultaneously consents to be taken to the receiving state for trial,
to be returned to the sending state to complete his present term, and
then to be taken again to the receiving state to serve any new sentence
imposed.
67
Article IV of the Agreement authorizes a receiving state prosecutor,
who has lodged a detainer against a prisoner confined in the sending
state, to make a written request for temporary custody of the inmate
in order that he may be brought to trial.68  Upon receipt of such a
request, the custodian must provide the prosecutor with a status certifi-
cate regarding the inmate. Here again, if other receiving state prose-
cutors have lodged detainers against the inmate, the custodian must
notify them of the request made by the first prosecutor and the reasons
for it.69 Article IV measures the time within which the prisoner must
66. For examples of the complications which may arise in these circumstances, see
State v. Lippolis, 244 A.2d 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968), affd, 257 A.2d 705 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 262 A.2d 203 (N.J. 1970), petition for cert. denied,
277 A.2d 884 (N.J. 1971); State v. Masselli, 202 A.2d 415 (N.J. 1964).
67. This presents a conflict with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, adopted in
most states, which provides that an accused may waive his right to contest extradition
only after a judicial hearing in which his rights are explained to him. 9 UNIFoRm LA Ws
ANN. 263-365 (1957). See notes 69 & 210 infra.
68. Importantly, nothing in Article IV requires the prosecutor to make such a request.
Under the Agreement, he has no obligation to bring about trial unless the inmate sets
the machinery in motion by requesting final disposition pursuant to Article IL. Of
course, a prosecutor can avoid even that possibility simply by failing to lodge a detainer.
See note 63 supra; contra, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRiMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 3.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
69. Article V recognizes that all prisoners sought by receiving state prosecutors under
the Agreement need not be made available by the sending state. An express provision
mandates a waiting period of thirty days after a request for temporary custody is re-
ceived by the custodian before the request can be honored. One court has referred to
the provision as "the 30-day waiting period required by the statute to permit a prisoner
to contest his removal to the demanding [receiving] state." State v. Chirra, 191 A.2d
308, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963). Nevertheless, it is clear that Article IV departs from
normal rendition procedure:
If the state seeks trial on the indictment, the prosecutor does not have to follow
the circuitous and cumbersome procedures which are necessary under the extradi-.
tion laws. Under the Agreement, the governor of the indicting state is bypassed.
The prosecutor's request goes directly to the official of the other state having cus-
tody of the prisoner, who apparently is not required to notify the governor of the
request.
Note, Convicts--The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RuT-
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be brought to trial in the receiving state from the date of his arrival
there70  Trial must be commenced within one hundred-twenty days
after the prisoner arrives, unless a continuance is granted for good
cause shown in open court with the inmate or his attorney in attend-
ance.
71
Article V of the Agreement establishes procedural machinery for im-
plementing, and imposes sanctions for violating, Articles III and IV.
In response to an inmate's request under Article III or a prosecutor's
request under Article IV, the custodian must offer to deliver temporary
custody of the prisoner to the receiving state. The grant of temporary
custody is solely for the purpose of trial on charges underlying de-
GERS L. REv. 828, 858 (1964) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Convicts].
During the thirty-day period, the sending state governor may disapprove the request,
on his own or the prisoner's motion, and may decline to deliver the inmate up for trial.
Importantly, Article IV does not require that the inmate be notified of the prosecutor's
request for temporary custody or his right to petition the governor for an order denying
the request. Of course, local regulations may specify that notice is to be given. E.g.,
Kansas Governor's Extradition Manual 66 (1972). However, Article IV itself appar-
ently contemplates that the governor will act sua sponte, if at all. While it is expressly
provided that the governor may act in response to a motion from the prisoner, without
notice of the request the inmate has no practical opportunity to make a timely motion.
In order to avoid the arbitrary denial of a statutory right, due process may require that
the inmate be notified of any request for temporary custody and his rights concerning
it. See State ex rel. Garner v. Gray, 201 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. 1972).
If the governor fails to act within thirty days, the receiving state prosecutor must be
granted temporary custody of the inmate. The prisoner has no right to demand that
the governor affirmatively order his delivery to the receiving state; he can only seek an
order refusing such delivery. Thus the Agreement itself suffices for consent to tempo-
rary custody in most cases without the need for affirmative action, and only if the send-
ing state governor steps in to exercise his power to refuse delivery is temporary custody
denied. This is, of course, just the opposite of traditional interstate rendition law. Ordi-
narily, a fugitive from justice in another state can be delivered only upon the authority
of a governor's warrant issued by the executive in the state where the prisoner is held.
That is, affirmative action is necessary. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 263-355 (1957). Under Article IV of the Agreement, however, affirmative
action is not required and, in the normal case, the prisoner may be delivered to the re-
ceiving state after the thirty-day period has expired without action by the governor.
70. At least one court has taken the view that the prisoner must be transported to
the receiving state within a reasonable time after the prosecutor makes a request for tem-
porary custody:
[I]he statute [Agreement on Detainers] impels the determination that when the
prosecuting officials of a party state request temporary custody of a prisoner in an-
other party state for trial, they must continue their effort to obtain delivery of the
prisoner from the other state with all reasonable diligence and dispatch.
State v. Chirra, 191 A.2d 308, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963).
71. People v. White, 305 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (App. Div. 1969) (motion to suppress




tainers or charges arising out of the same transaction. At the earliest
practicable time, consonant with effectuating the Agreement's purpose,
the inmate must be returned to the sending state to continue serving
his present sentence.
The crux of Article V is its sanction section. Section (c) provides
that if (1) the receiving state refuses or fails to accept temporary cus-
tody of the inmate, 72 or (2) trial is not commenced under Article II
within one hundred-eighty days and any valid continuance after receipt
of a prisoner's request,7 3 or (3) trial is not commenced under Article
IV within one hundred-twenty days and any valid continuance after the
prisoner's arrival in the receiving state,74 then the receiving state court
having jurisdiction of the prosecution must dismiss the indictment, in-
formation, or complaint with prejudice.75  Furthermore, any detainer
based upon the charge ceases to have force or effect. Thus the sanc-
tion is severe, cutting off prosecution altogether if the receiving state
frustrates the purpose of the Agreement by failing to comply with its
mandatory terms.
70
Il. THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRAL
A. Development in State Courts
Efforts to deal with the problems associated with detainers must be
viewed against a background of the development of the right to a
72. E.g., State v. Chirra, 191 A.2d 308 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963).
73. E.g., Hoss v. State, 292 A.2d 48 (Md. 1972).
74. People v. Esposito, 238 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Queens Co. Ct. 1960) (dictum).
75. It is the court in the receiving state that is to dismiss the charge. State v. West,
191 A.2d 758 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963). A court in the sending state lacks power to affect
a pending prosecution in the receiving state directly but may validly issue an order ex-
punging a detainer from a prisoner's prison records. See Baker v. Schubin, 339 N.Y.S.2d
360 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
76. It should be noted that, although the Uniform Act withdraws jurisdiction to enter-
tain a prosecution after the statutory time period has elapsed and thus imposes a self-
executing sanction (see note 51 supra), the Agreement does not go so far. Article V
merely requires the court to dismiss with prejudice. While the issue is not free from
doubt, apparently the prisoner must move for dismissal. State v. West, 191 A.2d 758
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1963). The distinction may have dire consequences. In State v.
Mason, 218 A.2d 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966), the court held that a continuance may
be granted only if the state makes a showing of good cause before the 180-day period
expires. But in State v. Lippolis, 262 A.2d 203 (N.J. 1970), the court rejected Mason
and held that, so long as the state moves for a continuance and makes a showing of
good cause before the court dismisses the prosecution a continuance may be validly
granted. Thus the effect of requiring the inmate to move the court for dismissal under
Article V of the Agreement is to enlarge the time period within which the state may
seek a continuance.
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speedy trial. Prior to the last decade, the state's responsibility to bring
about trial of an accused already in prison serving a sentence imposed
for another offense was seen as different from its responsibility to-
ward defendants released on bond or held in jail pending trial. Al-
though most state constitutions include speedy trial provisions, 77 many
courts that considered the issue held that a prison inmate was not en-
titled to the right.78  The theory was that the right to a speedy trial
protects the defendant from prolonged pre-trial confinement and the ac-
companying anxiety and embarrassment to reputation. A prison in-
mate was thought to suffer none of these difficulties. Particularly if
the inmate-defendant was confined in another jurisdiction, courts con-
sistently held that trial could be delayed until the expiration of the
prisoner's present term. 0
Perhaps in response to the criticism levelled against the majority
rule, a few courts came to the conclusion that a state must make a
reasonable effort to obtain custody of a prison inmate confined in an-
other jurisdiction, in order that he may be brought to trial.8 0 The mi-
nority view became that, although the state having custody of the in-
mate may decline to cooperate, nevertheless the state wishing to prose-
cute has a responsibility to at least attempt to have the case tried ex-
peditiously. A reasonable request addressed to the state where the pris-
oner is held was considered a first and necessary step in meeting that
responsibility.
B. Development in the Supreme Court-
The Sixth Amendment
In 1967, the complexion of the law regarding speedy trial for prison
inmates changed dramatically with the Supreme Court's decision in
Klopfer v. North Carolina"1 that the speedy trial guarantee of the
sixth amendment8 is applicable to the states.83 Although Klopfer in-
77. See L. KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 247-365
(1972) [hereinafter cited as KATZ].
78. E.g., Cooper v. Texas, 400 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1966). Many courts, however,
extended the right to prisoners confined in local institutions. E.g., Rader v. People, 334
P.2d 437 (Colo. 1959); Hottle v. District Court, 11 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1943).
79. Effective Guaranty, supra note 21, at 769-71.
80. E.g., People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1967); Barker v.
Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 415 P.2d 809, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1966);
Commonwealth v. McGrath, 205 N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1965); People v. Bryarly, 178
N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 1961).
81. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
82. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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volved a defendant free on his own recognizance pending reinstitution
of a criminal prosecution, the Court's reasoning reached any case in
which trial is delayed in violation of the sixth amendment. Signifi-
cantly, the Court emphasized, as constitutionally protected interests,
forms of oppression that arise even if the accused is already in prison
serving a sentence for an unrelated offense."4 The Klopfer opinion
clearly foreshadowed an extension of the federal constitutional right to
a speedy trial to prison inmates.
Although a requirement that a prisoner confined in a local institution
be afforded a speedy trial offered no insurmountable difficulties, 5 the
extent of the state's responsibility to an inmate-defendant confined in
another jurisdiction was altogether unclear. Even after Klopfer most
state courts took the position that trial in such a case may be delayed
until the expiration of the inmate's present term. 6 Then, in Smith v.
Hooey, 7 the Supreme Court took a different view. The Court rea-
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
83. Writing for the Court, the Chief Justice said that "the right to a speedy trial is
as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment," and that, conse-
quently, the federal provision applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
386 U.S. at 222-23.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the theory that the fourteenth
amendment "'incorporates' or 'absorbs' as such all or some of the specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights" is unsound constitutional doctrine. Id. at 226. He would have
rested the Court's result in Klopfer on a fundamental fairness notion derived from the
due process clause.
The difference between the Chief Justice and Justice Harlan only revived the peren-
nial controversy over the proper interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Whether one school of thought has ever had the best of that debate is still an interesting
theoretical question. On a practical level, however, the adoption by the Klopfer Court
of the view that the sixth amendment itself is applicable to the states may have signif-
icance. Presumably, Klopfer held that state proceedings are governed by the standards
developed by the federal courts for federal criminal proceedings. That is, Klopfer made
all the federal cases decided under the sixth amendment equally binding upon the states.
On the other hand, if the Court had adopted Justice Harlan's due process theory, the
states might have been left with more leeway within which to develop their own stand-
ards. New practices would clearly have been required to be fundamentally fair, but ar-
guably they might have been less stringent than those followed by the federal courts.
As it is, the federal question whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been de-
nied is the same whether the case arises in state or federal court.
84. 386 U.S. at 222, quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
85. See Convict's Right, supra note 17, at 356.
86. See the discussion in Commonwealth v. Clark, 279 A.2d 41 (Pa. 1971). There
were notable exceptions. E.g., Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968).
87. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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soned that a prison inmate suffers from pre-trial delay just as any
other accused does and, accordingly, the speedy trial right extends to
him wherever he is held:
Suffice it to remember that this constitutional guarantee has univer-
sally been thought essential to protect at least three basic demands of
criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: "[1] t9 prevent un-
due and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, [2] to minimize anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation and [3] to limit the possi-
bilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself.".. . These demands are both aggravated and compounded in
the case of an accused who is imprisoned by another jurisdiction. 88
Thus the Court held that, "[u]pon the petitioner's demand, Texas had
a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him
before the Harris County court for trial." 9
Smith v. Hooey left open the question whether Texas was required
to dismiss the indictment. In a subsequent case, the Court discussed
but still did not resolve the problem. In Dickey v. Florida,0 in re-
sponse to a demand, a prison inmate had been returned from federal
prison and tried for robbery after a delay of eight years. The Court
apparently found no constitutional bar to the trial itself, but reversed
the conviction on the ground that the accused had made an impressive
showing of prejudice to his defense. Thus the Court implied, but did
not squarely decide, that a finding of prejudice, going to the defend-
ant's ability to defend himself, is a necessary element for a determina-
tion that the right to a speedy trial has been denied. That view was
widely held until only recently.91 Perhaps more importantly, Dickey,
88. Id. at 377-78 (footnote omitted), quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,
120 (1966); accord, Arrowsmith v. State, 175 S.W. 545, 546-47 (Tenn. 1915).
89. 393 U.S. at 382-83; cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); see Teets v. West
Virginia, 322 F. Supp. 695' (N.D.W. Va. 1971); Hadlock v. State, 478 P.2d 295 (Idaho
1970) (the effort need not be successful). Although they recognized that change
seemed in the wind, the lower courts emphasized the requirement that the inmate de-
mand trial as did the prisoner in Smith. See Short v. Cardwell, 444 F.2d 1368 (6th
Cir. 1971); cf. Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F.2d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 1971) (where the de-
mand requirement was mitigated because the state failed to indict the defendant).
90. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
91. E.g., United States v. Key, 458 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 927
(1972); United States v. King, 431 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1970); ci. United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (see text ac-
companying notes 99-114 infra), however, the Court said that prejudice is only one of
several factors which must be considered when an accused raises a speedy trial claim.
And in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), the Court expressly held that prejudice
is not an essential element of a scmsfuiil claim,
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like Smith v. Hooey, involved an inmate who had demanded trial, and
the Court again seemed to assume that a demand for trial is necessary
before a criminal defendant can complain of delay.92
The next speedy trial case to reach the Supreme Court was United
States v. Marion 3 In that case, the defendants had been charged
with fraud in connection with the operation of a home improvement
business. They contended that a three-year delay between the first
act covered by the charge and the issuance of the indictment constituted
a denial of their right to a speedy trial. The Court rejected that argu-
ment, however, and held that "the Sixth Amendment speedy trial pro-
vision has no application until the putative defendant in some way be-
comes an 'accused.' ,,94 A defendants right to a speedy trial attaches
when he is formally charged or when he is taken into custody and held
to answer.95 A defendant already in prison becomes an accused at
least when a detainer is lodged against him. 96 Prior to that critical
point, his right against delay is governed by the applicable statute of
limitationsr or the due process clauses.98
Finally, in Barker v. Wingo,99 the Court attempted to deal thor-
oughly with all aspects of the right to a speedy trial. Barker took note
of three ways in which the right differs from other constitutional guar-
92. Inasmuch as both Dickey and Smith v. Hooey involved prisoners who had made
demands, the precise question whether a demand for trial was necessary was not pre-
sented, and any language in the opinions suggesting approval of the demand-waiver doc-
trine must be considered dicta. See note 89 supra.
93. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
94. Id. at 313.
95. See United States v. Hanna, 347 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 n.2 (D. Del. 1972). Of
course, the arrest must be in connection with the same charge. United States v.
DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
96. Dodge v. People, 495 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1972); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297
A.2d 127 (Pa. 1972); see United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1964).
However, the Marion Court made clear that, if a formal charge is made prior to
the time at which a detainer is lodged, the sixth amendment should come into play at
the time of that formal charge. 404 U.S. at 320.
97. But see notes 139 & 222 infra.
98. Cf. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see generally Robinson
v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Marion, the government conceded
that due process would require dismissal "if it were shown at trial that the pre-indict-
ment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellee's rights to a fair trial
and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused."
404 U.S. at 324. Generally, Marion has been read to permit substantial pre-charge de-
lay, particularly in complex cases. E.g., United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 848 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972) (securities fraud prosecution); United States
v. Brown, 354 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (mail theft).
99. 407 US. 514 (1972),
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antees. First, not only the accused but also society has an interest in
seeing that a criminal prosecution is not unduly delayed. A defendant
released on bond prior to trial has an opportunity to commit other
offenses or to flee from justice. In addition, pre-trial confinement of
defendants unable to make bail is often brutal, destructive of char-
acter, and costly.100 Second, the right to a speedy trial is unique in
that delay may well work to the defendant's advantage. Quite often
the defense may want to delay proceedings, hoping that the prosecu-
tion's case will be weakened by disappearing witnesses or that, at the
very least, stale evidence will be less persuasive at trial. Accordingly,
"unlike the right to counsel ... , deprivation of the right to a speedy
trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself."''1
Third, the right to a speedy trial is imprecise. "It is, for example, im-
possible to determine with precision when the right has been denied.
We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift but deliberate."'
02
Next, the Court dealt with "two rigid approaches" urged by the par-
ties as "ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts ex-
perience in protecting the right."'' 0  Counsel for Barker argued that
the Court should interpret the sixth amendment as requiring that a
criminal defendant be offered a trial within a fixed time period after
arrest or formal charge.10° While recognizing the appeal of that ap-
proach and the existence of state statutes and rules which accomplish
the same result, the Court declined "to engage in legislative or rule-
making activity, rather than the adjudicative process ..... ,10 To
the contrary, the Court held flatly that there is "no constitutional basis
for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified
number of days or months."' 0 6 Of course, the states and the federal
100. Id. at 520.
101. Id. at 521.
102. Id; see Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (right to a speedy trial is
"consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances"). Additionally, the Barker
Court noted that the uncertainty surrounding the right to a speedy trial leads to dismissal
as an "unsatisfactorily severe remedy." 407 U.S. at 522. While complaining that dis-
missal is a more serious remedy than the exclusionary rule or a reversal and order for
a new trial, the Court said that it nevertheless is "the only possible remedy." Id. Subse-
quently, the Court reiterated that view in Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
103. 407 U.S. at 522-23.
104. An amicus curiae brief by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
argued forcefully that the framers intended the sixth amendment to require trial within
six months after an accused is held to answer.
105. 407 U.S. at 523.
106. Id. This holding has received good marks in the literature. See, e.g., The Su-
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government are free to enact statutes, and courts may promulgate rules,
that protect the constitutional right to a speedy triallOT However,
the Court concluded that the sixth amendment itself is less precise.
The state contended, and the court below held, that an accused may
complain of a denial of his right to a speedy trial only if he demanded
trial during the period of delay. Thus the Court was urged to embrace
the "demand-waiver doctrine," the well-entrenched 08 but much-ma-
ligned' 09 rule that a defendant waives his right to a speedy trial for
any period prior to a demand for trial. The Court, rejecting this ap-
proach, viewed the doctrine as inconsistent with its position on the
waiver of other constitutional rights"0 and repeated the general rule
that waiver of a constitutional right cannot be presumed from a silent
record."' The demand-waiver doctrine impermissibly assumes that
the defendant's failure to demand trial is a reasoned, tactical choice.
That, of course, is not always true. It is just as likely that the accused
is disadvantaged by delay and wants his day in court as soon as pos-
sible. Moreover, the doctrine puts defense counsel in the untenable po-
sition of moving for a speedy trial when, in fact, he would prefer a
reasonable continuance. The demand must be made immediately in
order to protect the defendant's right should the prosecution fail at a
later time to bring the case to trial. Perhaps the principal shortcom-
ing of the doctrine is that it places the burden of protecting the right
solely upon the accused. The Court made it clear that the Constitution
provides otherwise."'
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a defendant's failure to de-
mand trial is not irrelevant. In recognition of the uniqueness of the
speedy trial right, particularly its imprecision and the possibility that
preme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 52, 164, 167-69 (1972). However, the
contrary view is not without support. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Tamm, J.).
107. The Court was at pains to make this clear, pointing particularly to the local rules
adopted in the Second Circuit. 407 U.S. at 523; see Comment, Speedy Trials and the
Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 71 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1059 (1971).
108. The Court recognized that every federal circuit and most states adhered to the
rule. 407 U.S. at 524.
109. E.g., Cohen, Speedy Trial for Convicts: A Reexamination of the Demand Rule,
3 VALPARAso U.L. Rav. 197 (1969); Convict's Right, supra note 17, at 360-63.
110. 407 U.S. at 525; see Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. Rav.
1587, 1609-10 (1965).
111. 407 U.S. at 525-26; accord, Caruley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
112. 407 U.S. at 527.
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delay may actually benefit the accused, the Court held that "the de-
fendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is
one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation
of the right." Going further, the Court adopted an ad hoc balanc-
ing test to be applied on a case-by-case basis whenever a denial of the
right to a speedy trial is in issue. Four related factors must be
weighed: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for it; (3) the de-
fendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right; and (4) the exist-
ence or absence of prejudice to the accused.11
4
C. State Implementing Legislation
Just as the courts have been active in the development of speedy
trial doctrine in recent years, state legislatures have exhibited an inter-
est in enacting laws that serve to implement the constitutional guaran-
tee." As a general proposition, it seems beyond argument that state
legislatures are free to adopt measures that bear upon constitutional
issues. There is no reason to suppose that fluid constitutional provi-
sions forever occupy the fields they touch upon, to the exclusion of
ordinary statutory regulation. Indeed, the Supreme Court made it clear
in the Barker case that the states may enact valid statutes that effectu-
113. Id. at 528.
114. For an examination of Barker, see Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets
a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLuM. L. Rnv. 1376, 1382-91 (1972).
115. The discussion here is limited to state legislation. Although a number of bills
have been introduced in the Congress, the federal government has not yet adopted legis-
lation to effectuate the right to a speedy trial. Outside the sixth amendment itself and
occasional local rules, the only federal law on point is rule 48(b) of the Federal 'Rules
of Criminal Procedure:
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to the grand jury or in filing
an information against a defendant who has been held to answer in the district
court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court
may dismiss the indictment, information, or complaint.
FED. R. Crum. P. 48(b).
Rule 48(b) implements the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the court's inher-
ent power to dismiss for want of prosecution. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354,
361 n.7 (1957). The rule necessarily contemplates that an indictment valid under the
applicable statute of limitations may be dismissed, United States v. Rutkowski, 337 F.
Supp. 340, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and permits dismissal of a criminal charge even though
there has been no violation of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Mathies
v. United States, 374 F.2d 312, 314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. McKee, 332
F. Supp. 823, 826 (D. Wyo. 1971). Importantly, however, the rule is expressed entirely
in terms of the trial court's discretion. Consequently, it has never been a significant
safeguard against pretrial delay. Still, some states have copied it. E.g., ALAS. R. CrIM.
P. 43(b); HAw~n R. CPam. P. 48(b); see State v. Fischer, 285 A.2d 417 (Del. 1971).
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ate the right to a speedy trial.1 6 Accordingly, the American Bar As-
sociation has recommended 1 7 and most states have adopted 1 8 statutes
or rules that implement the state and federal constitutional require-
ments. These statutes and rules reflect sound legislative thinking,
formulated from a broad social policy perspective. They indicate a
collective judgment that the interests of the public and the accused
can only be served if the constitutional right to a speedy trial is ad-
equately protected and that a fixed time period within which trial must
be had is necessary to achieve that end." 9
While the state speedy trial statutes are similar in that they all es-
tablish a fixed time limit for the commencement of criminal trials, in
other respects they vary in approach. Some older statutes purport to
require the accused to demand trial and measure the statutory time
period from the date of the demand. 20 Newer statutes make no men-
tion of a demand but measure the time within which trial must be com-
menced from a specified stage in the criminal process. A few statutes
focus on the arraignment,' 21 but the most common choice is the time
of arrest 2 2 or, if a formal charge is made before arrest, the time
of the indictment, information, or complaint.' 28  Some statutes express
the time period in court terms,' 24 but most employ a set number of
days, usually one hundred-eightyl
2e or sixty days.' 2 1
Additionally, speedy trial statutes are conceived of differently in the
various jurisdictions. Some statutes are considered a legislative defi-
nition of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and courts in those
jurisdictions view the fixed time limits established by the statutes as co-
116. 407 U.S. at 523.
117. ABA PROiECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
118. See KATz, supra note 77; Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice De-
lay, 57 CORNELL L. Rnv. 794 (1972).
119. Cf. United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971).
120. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10(2) (a) (1971).
121. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(3) (West Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3402 (Supp. 1973).
122. E.g., FLA. R. CIum. P. 1.191(a) (1); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1970).
123. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-
21(1966).
124. E.g., Am STAT. ANN. § 43-1708 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1972).
125. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1207 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-20-
19---41-20-23 (Supp. 1972).
126. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. H9 178.556-.562
(1) (1971).
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extensive with the maximum allowable delay under the constitutional
standard. The result is that a violation of such a statute is taken to
be a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial
as well. 127  On the other hand, some jurisdictions consider their speedy
trial statutes as distinct from the constitutional guarantee. Therefore,
so long as the statute is applicable and enforced in a given case, no
constitutional issue need be resolved. The statute imposes a more
stringent standard upon the prosecutor than does the constitutional
guarantee, and that standard is controlling.
128
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DETAINER STATUTES
It remains to place the detainer statutes in their appropriate position
in this scheme of the development of the right to a speedy trial in ju-
dicial decisions and legislative enactments. In 1957, when the de-
tainer statutes were drafted and first published, a prison inmate's con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial had not yet been clearly established.
2 9
Although the preamble to the Agreement on Detainers refers vaguely to
the "difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcer-
ated,"' 30 neither the Agreement nor the Uniform Mandatory Disposi-
tion of Detainers Act was designed to protect any constitutional right
of prison inmates. Quite the contrary, the draftsmen assumed that
the Constitution had nothing to say on the matter. The problems as-
sociated with detainers were seen as administrative,13' involving sub-
stantial difficulties for inmates but not rising to constitutional signifi-
cance.
Now, however, it is clear that the detainer statutes do affect con-
stitutional rights, and cases can be imagined in which they may in-
terfere with the constitutional right to a speedy trial.' 82  Additionally,
inasmuch as the right to a speedy trial has now been extended to prison
inmates, the detainer statutes must be compared with general statutes
127. E.g., Flanary v. Commonwealth, 35 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1945).
128. E.g., People v. Stuckey, 216 N.E.2d 785, 786 (IIl. 1966).
129. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), extending the reach of the
sixth amendment to the states, was not decided for another decade. Even then, the ques-
tion whether a prison inmate was entitled to the right was unclear until the Supreme
Court's opinion two years later in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
130. AGREwmNr ON DETAmnRS art. I.
131. See text accompanying notes 46 & 59 supra; contra, Hoss v. State, 292 A.2d 48
(Md. 1972).
132. See notes 133-59 infra and accompanying text; see generally notes 77-114
supra and accompanying text.
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designed to implement that right. To the extent the detainer statutes
depart unreasonably from the general speedy trial statutes, grave equal
protection questions are raised. Therefore, state legislatures have a
responsibility to analyze the detainer statutes in constitutional terms.
Such an examination will reveal that the detainer statutes represent
an understandable but nonetheless clear legislative error, particularly
for those states that have enacted the statutes in the mistaken belief
that they will do what they were never intended to do-protect prison
inmates' right to a speedy trial.
A. The Speedy Trial Challenge
1. The Pre-Barker Argument
As the right to a speedy trial began to take shape in the Supreme
Court's decisions from Klopfer v. North Carolina33 to Smith v.
Hooey'34 and Dickey v. Florida,3 ' the commentators laid the detainer
statutes next to the new constitutional doctrine and identified the in-
consistencies. 3 6 Principally, it was pointed out that neither statute
purports to cover all cases. The Uniform Act requires the custodian
to notify the inmate of any outstanding charge of which he has knowl-
edge or notice, thus affording the prisoner an opportunity to invoke
the Act to bring about final disposition. However, nothing in the Act
protects the inmate from delay in the prosecution of a charge of which
the custodian is unaware. The Act places no duty on the prosecutor
concerned to notify the custodian or the inmate of the existence of an
accusation. a 7  In a like manner, the Agreement on Detainers, while
failing to require action on the part of the prosecutor, expressly limits
its own application to cases in which a detainer is filed.3 8 Clearly,
the Agreement proceeds on the assumption that the prosecutor has no
constitutional responsibility to the accused inmate and that it would be
inappropriate or unworkable to impose a statutory obligation upon
him. Since the objective is to ameliorate the difficulties flowing from
133. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
134. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
135. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
136. See, e.g., Walther, Detainer Warrants and the Speedy Trial Provision, 46 MARQ.
L. REv. 423 (1963) (surveying cases prior to Kiopfer and Smith); Note, The Interstate
Criminal Detainer and the Sixth Amendment, 23 ARm L. REv. 634 (1970) (surveying
cases since Smith).
137. Convicts, supra note 69, at 859.
138. See Effective Guaranty, supra note 21, at 775; note 63 supra.
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detainers, the Agreement does not come into play in a case in which
the prosecutor fails to contact the institution.'8 0
Notwithstanding their substantial shortcomings, the detainer statutes
have received strong and consistent support from both the cases and
the commentators. Deficiencies have been identified, but suggestions
from critics have centered on recommendations for salutary interpre-
tation 40 or, in some cases, piecemeal amendment.' 41  The most sweep-
ing suggestion has come from the American Bar Association Project
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. A special standard
takes account of the detainer statutes' failure to require the prosecutor
to lodge a detainer so as to invoke the applicable detainer statute.
Thus the standard requires a prosecutor who knows that "a person
charged with a criminal offense is serving a term of imprisonment in
A penal institution of that or another jurisdiction," to obtain "the
presence of the prisoner for trial," or to file a detainer "with the of-
ficial having custody of the prisoner.' 42  If the prosecutor chooses
only to lodge a detainer and thus warn the inmate of a possible trial
139. It is also important to note that neither statute deals with delay prior to formal
charge. Each applies only if an untried indictment, information, or complaint is out-
standing. Accordingly, even though delay prior to the stage of formal accusation may
be quite detrimental to the inmate concerned, the statutes offer no protection. The
prosecutor may well delay a complaint or even the issuance bf an arrest warrant and
thus avoid warning the inmate of his peril. Generally, in cases traversing state bounda-
ries, the applicable statute of limitations is tolled while the accused is absent from the
state and considered a fugitive. Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Note, The Statute of Limitations: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U.
PA. L. REv. 630 (1954); Effective Guaranty, supra note 21, at 780. Additionally, it
has been pointed out that neither of the detainer statutes adequately assures that the cus-
todian will fulfill his responsibilities. Convicts, supra note 69, at 860-63; see notes 48
& 64 supra. Nor does the Agreement satisfactorily protect the inmate against failure
of the receiving state to follow through on its commitment to accept temporary custody.
See note 70 supra. There is some support for the view that a failure to grant temporary
custody would raise a federal question cognizable on federal habeas corpus. See May
v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203, 205 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum); 49 NEn. L. REV.
166, 175 (1969). Finally, some of the provisions of the detainer statutes are vague or
ambiguous so that the proper interpretation is difficult to ascertain. E.g., notes 66, 69,
& 76 supra.
140. E.g., State v. Chirra, 191 A.2d 308 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1963); People v. Esposito,
201 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Queens Co. Ct. 1960); see Note, Extending the Smith v. Hooey
Duty to the Holding Jurisdiction, 23 ME. L. REv. 201 (1971).
141. Detainer System, supra note 23, at 554-55; Convicts, supra note 69, at 867; De-
tainers, supra note 10, at 437. One writer has suggested that a "uniform prison adminis-
trative system" should be devised to require inmates to come to an early decision on
whether to demand trial. Convict's Right, supra note 17, at 363.
142. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATINo TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 3.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
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in the future, the inmate, in order to obtain a prompt trial, must de-
mand it.
143
2. The Post-Barker Argument
The ABA standard contemplates that the detainer statutes, perhaps
with appropriate friendly amendments, will and should continue to
govern cases involving outstanding criminal charges pending against
prison inmates. That view is open to question. The development of
the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has passed the detainer stat-
utes by; the problems run too deep for amendment to be effective.
While they may have been sound enactments in 1957 when they were
proposed to address the administrative difficulties surrounding the de-
tainer system, in 1975 they can no longer withstand careful scrutiny.
Particularly in light of the Court's rejection of the demand-waiver doc-
trine in Barker v. Wingo,144 it cannot be maintained that a prosecutor's
responsibility to bring about the prompt trial of a prison inmate differs
materially from his responsibility in any other case. To the extent they
proceed upon an assumption that is no longer tenable and embody a
constitutional principle that is no longer viable, the detainer statutes
in their present form can only contribute to an essentially unconstitu-
tional state of affairs. Accordingly, legislation similar to that proposed
in the concluding section of this Article should be enacted.
Turning first to the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers
Act, it is at once clear that the demand-waiver doctrine is woven deeply
into the fabric of the statute. Indeed, the Act assumes that the prose-
cutor has no responsibility to proceed to trial expeditiously and that,
instead, he may only lodge a detainer or do nothing at all until the in-
mate is released after serving his present term. The Act assumes that
the inmate must demand trial and only seeks to put teeth into that
demand. The ABA standard takes account of the possibility that the
prosecutor will not lodge a detainer and requires him to do so. But
still the assumption that notice to the inmate will suffice persists. The
ABA standard merely assures. that the demand rule can operate. How-
ever, now that Barker has rejected the demand-waiver doctrine, it is
questionable whether a legislative enactment that so clearly embodies
it can stand.
145
143. Id. See also the apparent approval indicated in Coleman v. United States, 442
F.2d 150, 156 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
144. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
145. In view of the Supreme Court's speedy trial decisions, principally Barker, a num-
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The prosecutor, acting on his own or following the ABA standard,
may lodge a detainer against an inmate and wait to see whether the
prisoner will invoke the detainer statute to bring about trial. If the
inmate promptly files a request for final disposition and trial is com-
menced within the specified time period, no constitutional question will
arise.146 But what of the case in which the prisoner declines to make
a request? The question is whether the prosecutor, by lodging a de-
tainer as is contemplated by the Uniform Act, can successfully shift the
burden of bringing the case to trial to the accused. On first blush,
Barker seems to give a negative answer. The state has the responsibil-
ity to afford the inmate a prompt trial, and, if the prosecutor delays,
the balancing test is triggered. On the other hand, the existence of a
statute which clearly authorizes the prosecutor to do just what he is
doing may have some effect on the outcome under the balancing test.
In this case, the Uniform Act provides the accused with a simple and
efficient mechanism for bringing about trial if he so desires. More-
over, Barker recognized that a defendant's failure to demand trial is
still an important factor to be considered in a speedy trial case.'
4"
Finally, Barker premised its rejection of the demand-waiver doctrine
on the view that it is inconsistent with the rule followed in cases in-
volving the waiver of other constitutional rights. Nothing in Barker
suggests that, if the normal test for constitutional waiver is met, the
right to a speedy trial may not be waived.
148
The argument in the prisoner's behalf is straightforward. Barker
ber of state courts have taken a fresh look at the interpretations placed on their speedy
trial statutes. In order to avoid constitutional implications, some courts have overruled
prior decisions construing such statutes to require the accused to demand trial. E.g.,
Holland v. State, 480 S.W.2d 597 (Ark. 1972).
146. An underlying assumption here is that the Barker constitutional test does not re-
quire trial prior to the expiration of the time period prescribed in the Uniform Act. Cf.
Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 91 n.9, 507 P.2d 90, 96 n.9, 106 Cal. Rptr. 786,
792 n.9 (1973).
147. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
148. It is important to distinguish the significance Barker attached to a defendant's
failure to demand trial and the concept of waiver. It is not that in some cases a de-
fendant's failure to assert his right is so important a factor in the balancing test that
a waiver may be found. Rather, Barker squarely held that waiver may never be found
on the basis of the defendant's silence alone. Barker permits consideration of the de-
fendant's failure to demand trial in order to take account of the possibility that delay
may, in fact, work to the accused's advantage and that silence may indicate that the de-
lay has not prejudiced the defendant's case. Waiver is another issue altogether and must
be judged on the ordinary constitutional standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Clark v. Oliver, 346 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (E.D. Va. 1972);
text accompanying notes 152-57infra.
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firmly rejected the demand-waiver doctrine and placed the responsi-
bility for implementing the accused's right to a speedy trial on the state.
The Uniform Act embodies the demand rule and consequently encour-
ages a prosecutor to disregard Barker and to put a prison inmate in
just the untenable position the Barker Court described. The Act is an
express statement by the state legislature that prison inmates are some-
how different, that their cases are controlled by the demand rule,
Barker notwithstanding. That, of course, is not the case; recent de-
cisions agree that Barker applies to prisoners with outstanding criminal
charges.1 49  It is insignificant that the Uniform Act provides for notifi-
cation of the inmate, so that he can choose to request trial. The
point is that he has no obligation to do so in order to protect his con-
stitutional right. °50 The detainer statute is, in effect, only a codified
demand rule with sanctions against the state. It takes no account of
present constitutional doctrine, but, instead, contemplates and encour-
ages the application of doctrine now rejected.' 5'
Nor can a prison inmate's failure to make a request for trial be con-
sidered a waiver of his right to a speedy trial, following the test laid
down for the waiver of other constitutional guarantees. 52 Barker
disapproved the demand-waiver doctrine in part because it assumes
waiver from a silent record. In other cases, the Court has defined a
waiver of constitutional rights as an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.158 Consistently, the Court has re-
149. E.g., Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973); Prince v. Bailey, 464 F.2d 544,
545 n.1 (5th Cir. 1972); Leonard v. Vance, 349 F. Supp. 859, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127, 128 (Pa. 1972); State v. Starnes, 200
N.W.2d 244, 248 (S.D. 1972).
150. In point of fact, even prior to Barker a few courts had held that the demand
rule did not apply to a prison inmate who failed to assert his right to a speedy trial.
The situation of a prisoner unaided by counsel and perhaps unaware of the pending pros-
ecution was considered a rare exception to the demand-waiver doctrine. See, e.g., Mur-
ray v. Wainwright, 450 F.2d 465, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1971) (prisoner's failure to invoke
the Florida version of the Uniform Act not a waiver); Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney
General, 52 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1951); Fulton v. State, 12 S.W.2d 777 (Ark. 1929); Ar-
rowsmith v. State, 175 S.W. 545 (Tenn. 1915); but see United States v. DeTienne, 468
F.2d 151, 157 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973) ("experienced" inmate
held to have known he had a right to a speedy trial); McCrory v. Cook, 329 F. Supp.
83, 89 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (prisoner who was represented by counsel waived right to
speedy trial by failing to make a demand).
151. E.g., Fells v. Kansas, 343 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Kan. 1972) (requiring a state
prisoner to exhaust his remedies under the Agreement on Detainers-that is, to demand
trial-before applying for federal habeas corpus relief).
152. See notes 110-11 Yupra and accompanying text; cf. note 148 supra.
153. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see generally the discussion in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-42 (1973).
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quired the accused to act affirmatively, with full knowledge and under-
standing of the consequences, in order to effectively waive constitu-
tional protections. To this end, the assistance of counsel may be re-
quired.15 4  In many cases, a hearing is necessary to fully apprise the
accused of what is at stake, and a record must be kept to permit ju-
dicial review.' 5
Accordingly, if the Uniform Act is to be defended on the ground that
an inmate's failure to request trial within the context of the Act is a
valid waiver of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, it must be es-
tablished that the Act provides a procedure that satisfies the normal
test for constitutional waiver. Any such argument must fail. The Act
requires the custodian to apprise the inmate of the source and nature
of the outstanding charge. But the statute establishes no definite pro-
cedure for informing the prisoner of his options and the consequences
that may follow from any particular course of action. Moreover, the
question put-whether to seek prompt trial-calls for a tactical deci-
sion that should take into account the possibility of negotiation with the
prosecutor, an assessment of the evidence, and the likelihood of con-
viction and sentence if the case goes to trial. Thus, in a real sense,
the prison inmate is in need of counsel to advise him,""s yet nothing
in the Uniform Act requires more than simple notice. Certainly the
Act does not contemplate a hearing or a record of the information
made available to the inmate. Consequently, an inmate's failure to in-
voke the Act's machinery by requesting trial can hardly be considered
the sort of voluntary and intelligent decision necessary to sustain a
waiver of his constitutional right to be tried promptly. 57
154. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (counsel needed to protect privi-
lege against self-incrimination).
155. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty plea proceeding).
156. See Clark v. Oliver, 346 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (E.D. Va. 1972); see generally
Jacob & Sharma, supra note 21, at 578-89.
157. Waiver of the right to a speedy trial is not to be governed by the relaxed stand-
ard of voluntariness adopted in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), for
consent searches. In Schneckloth, the Court held that the police need not expressly tell
a suspect that he may withhold consent to an investigative search; so long as he gives
consent voluntarily, the search does not violate the fourth amendment. The Court rec-
ognized the difficulty in imposing finely-tuned procedural guidelines on police investiga-
tions in the field. However, at a later stage in a criminal prosecution, more stringent
safeguards are necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. E.g., Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (suspect must be informed of right to remain silent
and to have counsel present during custodial questioning). Particularly after formal
charge, an accpsed is entitled to precise procedure. Cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.. 68Z
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The Agreement on Detainers suffers from the same malady. Like
the Uniform Act, the Agreement assumes that the prosecutor need not
move to bring a prison inmate to trial in an expeditious manner. In-
stead, he may lodge a detainer and leave it to the inmate to bring about
trial by requesting final disposition of the charge under Article III.
The argument need not be restated. The point is that the statute sanc-
tions a prosecutorial practice that is at odds with the doctrine an-
nounced in Barker. The Agreement purports to retain the demand-
waiver rule for cases involving prison inmates, without establishing a
procedure which satisfies the test for constitutional waiver. Essentially
the same analysis applies to the procedure under Article IV of the
Agreement, whereby an out-of-state prosecutor is authorized but not
required to seek temporary custody of an inmate for trial. Article
IV assumes that the prosecutor has no constitutional duty to bring the
inmate to trial and only provides a mechanism which may be em-
ployed if the prosecutor chooses to move forward. After Smith v.
Hooey,158 however, it is clear that a diligent, good faith effort must
be made to gain temporary custody of the prisoner. Yet the Article
IV time period begins to run only after the prosecutor has obtained
custody of the inmate and returned him to the receiving state. Nothing
in Article IV requires the prosecutor to initiate that process. If the in-
mate is to be assured of invoking a fixed time period within which trial
must be commenced, he must initiate the process himself by request-
ing final disposition under Article lII. Once again, the statute effec-
tively requires the accused to bring himself to trial.159
B. The Equal Protection Challenge
While the relationship of the detainer system and the constitutional
right to a speedy trial has received some attention from the commen-
tators and in the courts, the equal protection aspects of the matter have
been largely ignored. Yet it is quite clear that an equal protection
argument can be constructed. The development of the right to a
speedy trial and the extension of that right to prison inmates gives rise
to the question whether a state may validly distinguish between one
(1972) (right to counsel at post-indictment lineup). In point of fact, Schneckloth ex-
pressly distinguished Barker as involving the question of waiver of a right which is guar-
anteed by the Constitution to preserve a fair trial, rather than a right which limits police
investigations. 412 U.S. at 237.
158. 393 U.S. 374 (1969); see text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
159. Cf. People v. MacDonald, 27 Cal. App. 3d 508, 103 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1972)
(Stephens, J., dissenting) (viewing the filing of a .etainer inadequate under Barker).
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class of criminal defendants, those already in prison, and other de-
fendants, those free on bail or held in a local jail pending trial. States
that have statutes which implement the right to a speedy trial typically
apply them only to defendants not already incarcerated, leaving in-
mates' cases to be governed by the detainer statutes.10° To the extent
the treatment of non-inmate defendants under a general speedy trial
statute differs materially from that afforded prisoners under the de-
tainer statutes, the constitutional validity of the statutory classification
is drawn into question.
This section will examine the speedy trial statute and the detainer
statutes in one state-California-in an effort to build an equal protec-
tion argument against retention of the detainer statutes in their present
form. The same sort of analysis in another state may arrive at a dif-
ferent conclusion. The strength of an equal protection challenge de-
pends upon the specific provisions of the statutes under examination.
In those states with weak speedy trial statutes or none at all, the de-
tainer statutes may be less vulnerable. The examination of the situ-
ation in California is intended only to demonstrate that a significant
equal protection issue may exist and that state legislatures and courts
should be prepared to deal with the problem.
Article I of the California constitution guarantees the accused in a
criminal case the right to a speedy trial,10 ' and, from the outset, the
California Legislature has sought to implement that right by statute. 02
Section 1382 of the Penal Code provides that, unless good cause for
delay is shown, a trial court must dismiss a criminal action if an in-
formation is not filed within fifteen days after the accused is arrested
or trial is not commenced within sixty days after the filing of an indict-
ment or information.1 63  Trial may be set for a date beyond the sixty-
160. E.g., State v. Brooks, 479 P.2d 893 (Kan. 1971). The New York speedy trial
tatute specifically excludes from coverage "any defendant who is serving a term of im-
prisonment for another offense." N.Y. CRiM. PRo. LAw § 30.30(3)(c)(i) (McKinney
Supp. 1973).
161. Specifically, the constitutional provision reads as follows:
In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the
right to a speedy and public trial ....
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13, cl. 1. The state constitutional provision has been held to re-
flect both the letter and the spirit of the similar language in the sixth amendment. Peo-
ple v. Crittenden, 93 Cal. App. 2d 871, 209 P.2d 161 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1949).
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West Supp. 1974).
163. Specifically, section 1382 provides as follows:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the action to
be dismissed in the following cases:
1. When a person has been held to answer for a public offense and an infor-
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day period if the defendant consents to the delay, so long as the trial
is actually commenced on that day or within ten days thereafter. How-
ever, the statute precludes inferring consent to delay from the defend-
ant's silence, unless he is represented by counsel or the court explains
his rights.
California was also one of the first states to adopt a statute similar
to the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act. Indeed, the
draftsmen of the Uniform Act borrowed freely from the California stat-
ute, now section 1381 of the Penal Code."' The statute requires the
prosecutor having responsibility for the case to bring a prison inmate
to trial within ninety days after the inmate delivers to the prosecutor a
written notice of his whereabouts and a request for trial." 5 A con-
mation is not filed against him within 15 days thereafter.
2. When a defendant is not brought to trial in a superior court within 60 days
after the finding of the indictment or filing of the information . . . except that
an action shall not be dismissed under this subdivision if it is set for trial on
a date beyond the 60-day period at the request of the defendant or with his con-
sent, express or implied, or because of his neglect or failure to appear and if the
defendant is brought to trial on the date so set for his trial or within 10 days
thereafter.
If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he shall not be deemed under
this section to have consented to the date for his trial unless the court has ex-
plained to him his rights under this section and the effect of his consent.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West Supp. 1974).
164. CouNcn. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTFD STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1959, at 167-69 (1958).
165. Specifically, section 1381 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whenever a defendant has been convicted, in any court of this state, of the com-
mission of a felony or misdemeanor and has been sentenced to and has entered
upon a term of imprisonment in a state prison . . and at the time of the entry
upon such term of imprisonment. .. there is pending, in any court of this state,
any other indictment, information, complaint, or any criminal proceeding wherein
the defendant remains to be sentenced, the district attorney of the county in which
such matters are pending shall bring the same defendant to trial or for sentencing
within 90 days after such person shall have delivered to said district attorney writ-
ten notice of the place of his imprisonment or commitment and his desire to be
brought to trial or for sentencing unless a continuance beyond said 90 days is re-
quested or consented to by such person, in open court, and such request or consent
entered upon the minutes of the court in which event the 90-day period herein pro-
vided for shall commence to run anew from the date to which such consent or
request continued the trial or sentencing. In the event that the defendant is not
brought to trial or for sentencing within the 90 days herein provided the court in
which such charge or sentencing is pending must, on motion or suggestion of the
district attorney, or of the defendant, . . . or on its own motion, dismiss such
action. If a charge is filed against a person during the time such person is serving
a sentence in any state prison . . . of this state . . . it is hereby made mandatory
upon the district attorney of the county in which such charge is filed to bring the
same to trial within 90 days after said person shall have delivered to said district
attorney written notice of the place of his imprisonment or commitment and his
desire to be brought to trial upon said charge, unless a continuance is requested or
consented to by such person, in open court, and such request or consent entered
upon the minutes of the court, in which event the 90-day period herein provided for
shall commence to run anew from the date to which such request or consent con-
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tinuance beyond the ninety-day period may be granted only if the ac-
cused consents in open court and his consent is entered in the record.
Finally, California has adopted the Agreement on Detainers in section
1389 of the Penal Code.16
1. The Intrastate Argument
Turning first to the intrastate situation, the broad question in equal
protection terms is whether sections 1381 and 1382 establish a classi-
fication that "rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest."'
10 7
At the outset, it is clear that a classification does exist. Section 1381
does not apply to all California defendants, but only to prison inmates
against whom outstanding criminal charges are pending. Section 1382,
on the other hand, applies to persons charged with crime other than
prison inmates. Of course, the equal protection clause does not bar all
classifications, but only those that fail to include all persons who are
similarly situated with respect to the legislative purpose.16 8 Thus the
initial task is to identify the purpose or purposes of the California
statutes and then to ask whether the classification of inmate and non-
inmate criminal defendants is rationally related to the state's objec-
tives.1
69
It has been held that the purpose of section 1382, the California
speedy trial statute, is to implement the state constitutional right to a
speedy trial. 7 0  Section 1381, the California version of the Uniform
Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, has as its purpose the resolu-
tion of the administrative problems associated with detainers based
tinued the trial. In the event such action is not brought to trial within the 90 days
as herein provided the court in which such action is pending must, on motion or
suggestion of the district.attorney, or of the defendant ... or on its own motion,
dismiss such charge ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1381 (West 1972).
166. See text accompanying notes 53-76 supra. California has also adopted a special
statute to govern cases in which a federal prisoner is charged with a state offense in
California. Since the statute follows the pattern established by the Agreement, it need
not be examined separately. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1381.5 (West 1972).
167. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); see
generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065, 1077-
87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Inasmuch as state statutes are chal-
lenged directly and no private conduct is involved, the fourteenth amendment require-
ment of state action is clearly satisfied. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879).
168. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALm. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949).
169. Developments, supra note 167, at 1077-87.
170. Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 507 P.2d 90, 106 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1973).
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upon untried criminal charges. The objectives of the two statutes are
by no means inconsistent; indeed, both may be achieved by assuring
that the trial of criminal cases is not delayed beyond a fixed time
period. The detainer statute's objective of clearing up detainers thus
blends with and is consumed by the overriding concern of section
1382-prompt trial for persons accused of crime.171
The next step in assessing the validity of the classification estab-
lished by sections 1381 and 1382 is to ask whether "all and only those
persons similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law are in-
eluded in it."'172  The answer must be no. The classification scheme
suffers from under-inclusion: section 1382 confers a benefit upon those
criminal defendants to whom it applies but fails to confer the same
benefit upon others who are similarly situated.173  Inmates are left out
of section 1382 altogether; their cases are controlled by section 1381.
Yet the cases essentially hold that a defendant's status as a prisoner
serving a present sentence does not detract from his interest in obtain-
ing a prompt trial on an outstanding charge. While it is true that an
inmate's incarceration is not due to the pendency of the new prose-
cution, he suffers from delay in numerous other ways, so much so that
the Supreme Court has said that an inmate needs the protection of
the speedy trial guarantee even more than do other defendants.1 7 4 Un-
der the circumstances, the conclusion which must be reached is that
prison inmates occupy the same position with respect to prompt trial as
do other persons accused of crime.
If the two provisions afforded identical treatment to the persons to
whom they apply, no constitutional issue would be presented. How-
ever, the treatment afforded is quite different. Under section 1382,
persons charged with crime are under no obligation to demand that
they be brought to trial. The statutory time limits go into effect im-
mediately upon arrest or formal charge, thus assuring prompt trial.
The time limits are fixed and may be disregarded only with the de-
fendant's consent or on a showing of good cause. Prison inmates pro-
ceeding under section 1381, however, must demand trial in order to
trigger the statutory time limit. Even then, the time period does not
171. Cf. People v. Jacobs, 27 Cal. App. 3d 246, 259, 103 Cal. Rptr. 536, 544 (1972)
("both sections 1381 and 1382 have the objective of protecting the accused from having
charges pending against him for an undue length of time").
172. Developments, supra note 167, at 1082.
173. Id. at 1084.
174, See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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begin to run until the prosecutor receives the prisoner's written request.
Given the grave constitutional questions involved in effectively requir-
ing an accused to bring himself to trial, it can hardly be argued that
imposing a demand rule upon prison inmates is not significantly dif-
ferent treatment.
In addition, the statutory time limits fixed for non-inmate prosecu-
tions pursuant to section 1382 are substantially shorter than that pre-
scribed by section 1381. Assuming the accused does not consent to
delay and the state makes no special showing, section 1382 requires
that a person be released or formally charged within fifteen days
after he is arrested, and he must be brought to trial within sixty days
after the date an indictment is found or an information filed. 175  On
the other hand, section 1381 allows a ninety-day delay and measures
that time period from the date of receipt of the prisoner's demand for
trial, not the date of arrest or formal charge.1 76  The result is that in
most cases trials of prison inmates may be delayed considerably longer
than the trials of non-inmate defendants. 177
2. The "New Equal Protection" Standard
Thus far the equal protection challenge to sections 1381 and 1382
has been couched in terms of the "old equal protection," which re-
quires only that a classification established by state legislation be ra-
175; See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
176. See note 165 supra and accompanying text; see also In re Mugica, 69 Cal. 2d
516, 446 P.2d 525, 72 Cal. ,Rptr. 645 (1968) (rejecting the view that the filing of a
detainer constitutes an arrest).
177. The analysis in the text proceeds on the assumption that the traditional, rational
basis test under the equal protection clause is the appropriate constitutional standard.
In the past, the Supreme Court has hesitated to strike down legislation under that relaxed
test. On the other hand, in view of the new life breathed into the traditional standard
in recent years, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forelvord: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 20-21 (1972), there is reason to believe that the Court would
invalidate the classification established by sections 1381 and 1382 if the question were
presented in an appropriate case. For an exploration of the Burger Court's development
of an enhanced version of the rationality test, see Yackle, Mr. Justice Powell and the
Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RICHMOND L. Rnv.
- (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yackle]. The thesis of that Article is that the Burger
Court has adopted an intermediate standard of review in equal protection cases not sub-
jected to strict scrutiny (see notes 178-95 infra and accompanying text) and that the




tionally related to a legitimate state purpose.1 7 8  It has been suggested
that the California statutes fail the traditional test, particularly in light
of the apparent new life breathed into that standard in recent years.'Y9
Additionally, however, it should be noted that an arguable case can be
made that the California statutes should be judged on the more strin-
gent standard associated with the "new equal protection." The Su-
preme Court has strictly scrutinized state classifications that interfere
with fundamental interests and has held that such classifications must
be shown to be necessary to some overriding and compelling state in-
terest.'1 0 Fundamental interests have been defined, in turn, as "rights
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."''8 Since the
right to a speedy trial springs from the sixth amendment as it applies
to the states through the fourteenth, 8 2 it can be argued that the clas-
sification established by sections 1381 and 1382 interferes with a fun-
damental interest-the right to a speedy trial-and therefore must be
measured against the strict scrutiny standard.
188
The difficulty with this view is that, while a state statute may be
designed to effectuate the right to a speedy trial, rarely does a court
consider such a statute coextensive with a similar constitutional pro-
vision, so that a violation of the statute is itself of constitutional
significance.' 8 4 And only in that situation is one justified in saying that
an underinclusive classification which denies the protection of a statute
to persons who logically should have its benefits per se interferes with
the constitutional guarantee as well. The relationship between the
178. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
179. See Yackle, supra note 177.
180. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
181. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
182. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); see notes 81-83 supra and ac-
companying text.
183. In point of fact, it can be argued that any classification that touches upon a
defendant's rights in the criminal process is subject to the strict scrutiny test. Cf. Grif-
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); but see Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417
(1974).
184. E.g., State v. Brann, 292 A.2d 173, 184-85 n.16 (Me. 1972). Although the Vir-
ginia court had held earlier, in Flanary v. Commonwealth, 35 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1945),
that the Virginia speedy trial statute is a legislative definition of what constitutes a
speedy trial in the constitutional sense, the federal court in Delph v. Slayton, 343 F.
Supp. 449 (W.D. Va. 1972), held that an interpretation of the sixth amendment cannot
be controlled by a state legislative enactment. See Edwards v. State, 295 A.2d 811 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (the 180-day time period prescribed by the Agreement on Detain-
ers is not a constitutional standard).
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California statutes and the constitutional right to a speedy trial is left
ambiguous by the cases. The California Supreme Court has recently
said that section 1382 constitutes a legislative determination that a
trial delayed more than sixty days is prima facie in violation of a de-
fendant's constitutional right.'85 And, in a case involving a prison
inmate, a lower court seemed to read the detainer statute into con-
stitutional significance, saying: "Whatever rights to a speedy trial ap-
pellant may have had were governed by Penal Code section 1381."'186
While these comments suggest that the California statutes are, in fact,
coextensive with the constitutional right to a speedy trial, there is lan-
guage in other cases tending to separate the statutory and constitutional
standards. 18
7
Additionally, it is critical that the state statutes are deemed coex-
tensive, not just with the speedy trial provision of the state constitu-
tion, but with the sixth amendment. The strict scrutiny test under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is a federal
standard applied when a federal constitutional right is threatened.
If sections 1381 and 1382 refer only to a state constitutional guaran-
tee, and that state right is something different from the federal right,
then no fundamental interest is involved and there is no obligation
to apply the strict scrutiny test. Of course, if the California Supreme
Court were to adopt federal equal protection doctrine for use in in-
terpreting the equal protection provisions in the state constitution,18
the strict scrutiny test might still be applicable. Thus the state court
might hold that, in applying the state equal protection guarantee, it
will strictly scrutinize a classification that interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental interest-a right guaranteed by the state constitution.
It is clear that the California courts consider sections 1381 and
1382 to have reference only to the state constitutional right to a speedy
trial.' 89 No federal sixth amendment issue and therefore no funda-
185. Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 507 P.2d 90, 106 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1973);
see also In re Vaca, 125 Cal. App. 2d 751, 271 P.2d 162 (1954) (linking the 60-day
period in section 1382 with the state constitution).
186. People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 678, 2 Cal. Rptr. 640, 641 (1960).
187. See People v. Rowden, 268 Cal. App. 2d 868, 873-74, 74 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451-
52 (1969).
188. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21.
189. See Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 507 P.2d 90, 106 Cal. Rptr. 786
(1973) (indicating that section 1382 implements the state constitutional right to a
speedy trial and rejecting the Barker balancing test as inapplicable to the interpretation
of the state provision).
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mental interest is normally implicated.190 Accordingly, a court examin-
ing the California statutes' validity under the federal equal protection
clause is not obligated to apply the strict scrutiny test. On the other
hand, the California cases indicate that a California court may never-
theless apply the strict scrutiny standard under its own state equal
protection guarantee.' 91 Pertinent provisions of the state constitution
have been interpreted to be substantially equivalent to the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment,' 92 and, in cases involving
classifications that interfere with the exercise of a fundamental interest,
the California court has employed the strict scrutiny test.193 Assuming
that the state constitutional right to a speedy trial is a fundamental in-
terest in the context of state equal protection doctrine, 94 the strict
scrutiny standard would seem appropriate in a case involving an
equal protection challenge to the classification established by sections
1381 and 1382.115
The upshot is this. The case against the classification of inmate and
non-inmate defendants is strong under the traditional, rational basis
test. Moreover, even if the statutes can withstand a challenge based
on the traditional standard, an argument can be made that the more
stringent strict scrutiny test is applicable, because the classification
touches upon a fundamental interest. It has been seen that the latter
190. The proposition in the text assumes that the state statutes, together with the state
constitutional guarantee, require trial prior to the date on which a court applying the
Barker balancing test would dismiss for want of a speedy trial under the sixth amend-
ment.
191. See note 188 supra.
192. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
193. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n.11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1971) (right to education); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.
3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971) (right to pursue a lawful
profession).
194. The California court hay referred to the state constitutional right to a speedy
trial as "fundamental." People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal. 2d 677, 682, 140 P.2d 381, 384
(1943).
195. It is worth repeating that the argument presented in the text proceeds on the as-
sumption that the California statutes are coextensive with the state constitutional right
to a speedy trial. The validity of that assumption is open to some doubt. If the Cali-
fornia court were to hold that the state constitutional right to a speedy trial is implicated
only long after the expiration of the statutory time limits, it would follow that the clas-
sification established by sections 1381 and 1382 denies to prison inmates the benefit of
a short statutory time limit but not the constitutional right to be -tried promptly. Ac-
cordingly, no fundamental interest would be infringed, and the strict scrutiny test would
be inapplicable.
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argument may well require an examination of state constitutional doc-
trine. In California, the argument may be successful, but in other
states different doctrines may compel rejection of the strict scrutiny
standard.
3. People v. Jacobs
The constitutional validity of the classification established by sec-
tions 1381 and 1382 has been challenged. In People v. Jacobs,'90
a prison inmate contended that his prosecution should have been dis-
missed under section 1382 because post-indictment delay had exceeded
sixty days. That argument was rejected on the ground that section
1382 was inapplicable to a case involving a prison inmate and that,
instead, section 1381 controlled. Since the inmate had not requested
trial in order to trigger the ninety-day time period prescribed by that
statute, he could not complain of the delay that occurred.
The Jacobs court attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to demonstrate
that inmates and non-inmates are not similarly situated. The court
simply stated the obvious-that prisoners are already incarcerated
while other defendants are free on bail or held in a local jail.19 7 Two
reasons were offered to show that this factual distinction justifies the
different treatment given the two groups under sections 1381 and 1382.
First, the court correctly observed that prison inmates cannot suffer
imprisonment solely because of delay in the trial of a new charge.'9 8
While this is true, it is also true that an outstanding criminal charge
can make an inmate's present term of confinement much more difficult
to bear. Moreover, prisoners, too, have an interest in avoiding pro-
longed anxiety and the possibility that delay will impair the defense.
The suggestion that prisoners' incarceration justifies different treat-
ment under the California statutes is, then, unpersuasive.
The Jacobs court's second justification is even less compelling. The
court noted that section 1381 gives a prison inmate the option of de-
manding trial within ninety days or waiting until after his present term
is completed before seeking a resolution of the charge. A prisoner
may prefer not to be tried while he is serving another sentence for
fear that his convict status may prejudice his chances of acquittal.19
Thus he may wish to forgo trial until he is released and can better
196. 27 Cal. App. 3d 246, 103 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1972).





participate in his own defense. The court apparently assumed that any
benefit conferred on prisoners under section 1381, but not shared by
other defendants under section 1382, constitutes support for the view
that the classification established by the statutes is valid. The court's
point is only the other side of the coin from the demand rule. Cer-
tainly, if a prisoner is required to demand trial under section 1381 in
order to invoke the ninety-day time period, it follows that he is left
with the option of choosing not to do so for tactical reasons. Jacobs
merely pointed out the fact but failed to say why it is appropriate to
give prisoners such an option while denying it to others. It remains
to be demonstrated why prison inmates should be entitled to this op-
tion, instead of the usual opportunity afforded all criminal defendants
to seek reasonable continuances.
20 0
The conclusion that must be reached is that the Jacobs opinion
faced but did not satisfactorily deal with the equal protection challenge
to sections 1381 and 1382. The points made by the court in support
of its decision upholding the classification fail to demonstrate that in-
mate and non-inmate criminal defendants are not similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the statutes. Accordingly, even when the
court arguably succeeded in identifying one way in which prison in-
mates receive better rather than inferior treatment, the result only
served to buttress the equal protection challenge. Hopefully, Jacobs
is not the last word from a California court on this question. Future
opinions should follow the line of analysis set forth in the preceding
section of this Article and should conclude that the classification estab-
lished by the California statutes is unconstitutional. 01
200. The ABA standard also affords the prisoner this choice. ABA PRoJEcT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL §
3.1 (Approved Draft 1968). Like the Jacobs court, the standard fails to give reasons
for maintaining inmates in a position different from that of other criminal defendants.
See text accompanying note 143 supra.
201. There is reason to think that the result in Jacobs will be rejected. In Hayes
v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 216, 490 P.2d 1137, 98 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1971), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that section 1203.2 of the Penal Code, which permits a Califor-
nia prisoner to request disposition of a probation matter in his absence, must be read
to apply as well to prisoners confined in other states. The court said that the exclusion
of out-of-state prisoners would constitute an irrational classification in violation of the
equal protection clause. And, in Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 507 P.2d 90,
106 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1973), the court, while still purporting to recognize that section
1382 does not apply to prison inmates, applied the sixty-day time limit to delay between
an order upholding a collateral challenge and the commencement of a new trial. Al-
though section 1382 does not by its terms govern such a case, the court said that the
statute must be read to control in order to save it from an equal protection challenge.
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4. The Interstate Argument
An equal protection challenge addressed to the classification of non-
inmate defendants and inmate defendants in other states established
by section 1382 and the Agreement on Detainers, section 1389, follows
the analysis of the intrastate situation set forth above. Once again, it
is clear that a classification exists, and the question is whether it ra-
tionally furthers a legitimate state purpose. The overriding purpose of
the statutes is to assure the prompt trial of criminal cases. Now that
Smith v. Hooey20 2 has extended the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial to defendants serving prison terms in other jurisdictions, and
Barker v. Wingo203 has rejected the demand-waiver doctrine, there is
no rational basis for the classification established by the California
statutes. Yet Article III of the Agreement imposes the demand rule on
the prisoners to whom it applies and then requires that trial be com-
menced six months after the inmate's request is received.204 Defend-
ants to whom section 1382 applies need not demand trial and are en-
titled to dismissal if trial is not commenced within sixty days following
indictment.205
Without retracing the argument set forth above, this section will focus
on the two principal ways in which cases involving out-of-state pris-
oners can be said to raise different questions. First, California has
no power to compel another sovereign to give up temporary custody
of a prison inmate in order that he may be brought to trial in Cali-
fornia.2 °0 The sixth amendment requires only that the state make
a "diligent, good faith effort" to obtain the sending state's coopera-
tion in bringing such a prisoner to trial.2 7  However, it does not fol-
low that an out-of-state prisoner's status justifies the demand rule. The
requirement that the inmate affirmatively act to bring about trial has
no necessary bearing on California's ability to obtain the sending
state's cooperation. Article HI of the Agreement embodies the demand
rule only because the draftsmen assumed it would remain accepted
doctrine; the rule has no special significance for interjurisdictional re-
lations. A better case can be made for the view that the dismissal sanc-
tion prescribed for violation of section 1382 is inappropriate in a case
202. 393 U.S. 374 (1969); see text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
203. 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see text accompanying notes 99-114 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
205. See note 163 supra.
206. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
207. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
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in which trial is delayed beyond sixty days because the sending state
declines to deliver up the inmate. On the other hand, section 1382
permits a continuance on a showing of good cause.208 In a case in
which California's good faith effort is unsuccessful, the trial court can
grant a continuance on a showing by the state that it is the sending
state's intransigence that is at fault.
Prison inmates incarcerated in other states present a second issue
which must be considered in the equal protection analysis. While it
seems clear that most cases involving local defendants can be brought
to trial within the sixty-day period prescribed in section 1382, it may
be unrealistic to suppose that prisoners can be located, obtained from
their keepers, churned through the interstate rendition process, and
transported from a distant institution within the space of sixty days
after formal charge. Accordingly, it can be argued that practicality
demands special provision for interstate cases, and the consequent un-
equal treatment of out-of-state prisoners is reasonable within the mean-
ing of the equal protection clause.209 Here again, however, section
1382 takes account of the practical problems presented. If the state
is unable to locate the accused after he is indicted, if the defendant
is involved in the criminal process of another jurisdiction, if the pro-
cedure for obtaining temporary custody or rendition is unexpectedly
time-consuming, or if the prisoner's transportation causes delay, it
would seem that the state would be able to establish good cause for
continuing the case beyond the sixty-day time period established by
section 1382.10
208. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
209. It has been suggested that the nationwide system for distributing information re-
garding criminal matters is sufficiently effective to justify placing the burden on a pros-
ecutor to locate an accused soon after he is apprehended in another jurisdiction. Then,
in order to avoid interference with that state's criminal process, the time period pre-
scribed in the speedy trial statute should begin to run on the date the prisoner begins
serving any new sentence in the sending state. See Effective Guaranty, supra note 21,
at 776-77.
210. Article IV of the Agreement raises an additional equal protection problem. No
account is taken of the inmate's rights under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9
UNIFORM IAws ANN. 263-355 (1957), enacted in most states. It can be argued that
Article IV establishes irrational discrimination between prisoners sought under the
Agreement and those sought through ordinary rendition channels. In the latter cases,
the Extradition Act provides for notice to the prisoner of the request for his custody
and his right to counsel, a reasonable period within which to apply for a writ of habeas
corpus, and a habeas corpus hearing. In contrast, prisoners sought under Article IV may
not even learn of the request for custody until it is too late to petition the governor
or a court for relief. See note 69 supra. The interstate rendition process is ignored.
See Convicts, supra note 69, at 858. At least one court has attempted to resolve the
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V. A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Up to this point, this Article has been concerned with constructing
a constitutional challenge to the detainer statutes. It has been argued
that the statutes are inconsistent both with the sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. If the argument is accepted, the various state legisla-
tures have the responsibility to revise their statutes so as to avoid in-
fringing upon protected interests and to forestall judicial invalidation
of the statutes. Additionally, there may be cases in which a court, ap-
plying the Barker balancing test, is unwilling to say that an inmate's
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. And, in some
states, a court like Jacobs may find enough give and take between the
detainer statutes and the general speedy trial statute to justify the clas-
sification of inmates and non-inmates they establish.2 1' In those
cases as well, state legislatures should face the question whether, as
a matter of policy, the detainer statutes should be maintained as they
are. Even if constitutional, the detainer statutes represent an out-dated
and misdirected approach to the basic problem of affording prompt
trials in criminal cases.
In this section legislative means for rationally dealing with the is-
sues raised will be proposed. The suggested approach would establish
and maintain a consistent theme of dealing with all persons accused of
crime in a single statute, requiring trial within a fixed period of time
after formal charge. Any practical difficulties which arise in cases in-
volving prison inmates would be handled under the statute by permit-
ting continuances for good cause. This approach turns the focus away
from the administrative difficulties associated with detainers and to-
ward the underlying problem of assuring that pending criminal charges
do not remain outstanding for an undue period of time.
An essential ingredient in the suggested approach is a firm state
policy against the filing or recognition of detainers based upon untried
criminal charges. It was pointed out early in this Article that the de-
tainer system developed as a consequence of the view that a prose-
conflict by reading the provisions of the Extradition Act into Article IV of the Agree-
ment. See State ex rel Garner v. Gray, 201 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. 1972). The amend-
ments to the Agreement proposed later in the Appendix take the same approach.
211. See, e.g., Morton v. Haynes, 332 F. Supp. 890, 893 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (equal pro-
tection not violated by a statute requiring faster trials in rural areas than in St. Louis);
State v. Bruno, 107 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1958) (equal protection not violated by state statute
of limitations that was extended for holders of public office).
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cutor's responsibility to bring a prison inmate to trial differs from his
responsibility to defendants free on bond or in jail pending trial 12
Now that that view has been rejected, the practice of lodging detainers
in lieu of prosecution can no longer be justified. Instead, legislation
should be adopted, requiring prosecutors to proceed against prison in-
mates just as they proceed against defendants who are not already in-
carcerated.
First, the general speedy trial statute should be amended to make it
clearly applicable to prison inmates, irrespective of where they are con-
fined. Once again, taking California as an example, section 1382
should be amended to include the following addition:
4. This section applies to all persons charged with criminal offenses
within this state and includes persons who are already incarcerated,
within -this state or elsewhere, serving sentences imposed for other of-
fenses.
213
The proposed amendment would legislatively overrule the California
cases which have held that section 1382 is inapplicable to prison
inmates.2 14 This done, section 1381, the California version of the Uni-
form Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, should be repealed.
With prison inmates in California subject to the general speedy trial
statute, there is no need for the process contemplated by the intrastate
detainer statute.
In a like manner, any reference to detainers based on untried charges
should be excised from section 1389, the Agreement on Detainers. The
suggested additions to and deletions from the Agreement are set forth
in the Appendix. In the first two Articles, it is proposed only to delete
references to detainers. Article I is to be repealed entirely, because
it embodies the demand rule and places the prisoner in the position of
bringing himself to trial. Under the proposed approach, Article IV of
the Agreement becomes the key provision, authorizing and encouraging
interstate cooperation in expediting the criminal process. No longer
is Article IV limited in operation only to those cases in which a de-
tainer has been filed.2"5 Instead, the prosecutor is expected to pur-
sue every case with the same vigor and to decide quickly whether or
not to bring an accused to trial. There is no longer a middle way-
lodging a detainer. The last few lines of section (a) are deleted and
212. See text accompanying notes 77-79, 133-39 supra.
213. For the text of section 1382, see note 163 supra.
214. See, e.g., People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal. 2d 677, 140 P.2d 381 (1943).
215. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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the language in brackets substituted in order to square Article IV with
the general statute governing interstate rendition.21 0  The provision
in section (b) for notification of other authorities in the receiving state,
who have charges pending against the inmate, raises a problem under
the proposed approach.117  While it is possible to require the custo-
dian to notify authorities that have lodged detainers, it is impractical
to require notification of officials who have not contacted the institu-
tion. On the other hand, given the difficulty of moving potentially
dangerous inmates about, every effort should be made to see that a
prisoner is tried on all charges pending in the receiving state in the
course of a single visit there. Inasmuch as the proposed approach
abolishes the use of detainers in lieu of prosecution, the best that can
be done is to require the custodian to notify officials he knows have
charges pending against the inmate. Section (c) is no longer needed,
because the sixty-day time period established by the general speedy
trial statute controls all cases. Section (d) is also deleted in order to
avoid conflict with ordinary interstate rendition procedure.
In Article V, the references to detainers and Article MT in sections
(a) and (b)(2) are deleted. Section (c) now contains the sanction
for failing to bring the inmate to trial within the time limits provided
in Articles III and IV. That language is deleted with the understand-
ing that the dismissal sanction in the general speedy trial statute will
apply.218 The deletion of the reference to detainers in section (d) is
only another change necessary to free Article IV from the requirement
that a detainer be lodged. Finally, section (a) of Article VI is deleted
with the view that it is subsumed under the provision for a continuance
for good cause in the general speedy trial statute. The remaining pro-
visions of the Agreement bear only upon the administrative procedure
for transporting the prisoner to and from the trial court, with the usual
concluding provision for liberal construction and separability. They re-
quire no amendment to be consistent with and, in fact, are quite neces-
sary to the efficient operation of the proposed legislation.
It is appropriate to compare the proposed legislation with the con-
216. See notes 69 & 210 supra.
217. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
218. Dismissal should be with prejudice. ABA PRoJ Ecr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 4.1 (Approved Draft
1968). In a state like California, where a charge dismissed under the general speedy
trial statute may be reinstituted, appropriate amendment will be necessary. To allow re-
instatement of a charge would be to dilute rather thgn t9 $trengthen the s4ttutory proteg-
lion now afforded prison inmates,
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stitutional objections to existing law made in this Article. Turning first
to the sixth amendment argument, the principal points are these: (1)
The detainer statutes in their present form do not operate unless a de-
tainer is lodged but fail to require prosecutors to contact the institu-
tion. Thus inmates are not protected against delay in prosecutions of
which they are unaware;219 (2) Even if the prosecutor is required to
lodge a detainer under the ABA standard, the detainer statutes impose
the demand rule upon prison inmates, without establishing a procedure
that satisfies the test for constitutional waiver.
220
The first objection to the detainer statutes has no application to the
proposed legislation, which eliminates altogether the use of detainers
representing untried charges. The proposed statute does not require
that a person be notified of a prosecution pending against him. In-
stead, the prosecutor has the duty to move forward with the prosecu-
tion itself. The proposed statute answers the second objection by put-
ting prisoners on equal footing with other defendants. Unless the in-
mate is represented by counsel or the court explains his rights to him,
consent to delay beyond sixtydays cannot be inferred from mere ac-
quiescence.2 21 The proposed statute places the burden of bringing
about the speedy trial of criminal cases squarely on the prosecutor's
shoulders and thus is consistent with the letter and spirit of Barker.
222
219. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 158-59 supra.
221. See note 163 supra.
222. A third objection to the Agreement on speedy trial grounds is partially answered
by the proposed legislation. While the detainer statutes operate only when a detainer
has been lodged against an inmate, the ABA standard requires a prosecutor to file a
detainer promptly after the prisoner is charged and his whereabouts become known. See
text accompanying note 142 supra. In order to avoid a breach of the standard, a prose-
cutor may delay the indictment and thus postpone dealing with the case as long as the
statute of limitations will allow. See note 139 supra. By placing the prison inmate in
the same position as other defendants, the proposed statute would improve the situation
considerably. A prosecutor would no longer be encouraged to delay charging a prisoner;
the sanctions and responsibilities would be similar for inmates and non-inmates alike.
It would be difficult to draft a workable statute to deal with delay prior to indictment.
Questions regarding the appropriate pace of criminal investigations and the amount of
evidence needed to support a formal charge are best left to good faith law enforcement,
guided by the prosecutor's office. If formal charge is delayed, the prosecutor's conduct
is governed by the applicable statute of limitations and the due process clause. See text
accompanying notes 97-98 supra. The proposed statute only removes any incentive to
delay formal charge in prisoners' cases more than in others. Inasmuch as the proposed
statute simultaneously relies on the statute of limitations to limit pre-charge delay and
purports to govern prosecutions against prisoners confined in other states, it is necessary
tp 4x~mine the statute of limitations to assure that it is adequate for the purpose. Spme
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Turning to the equal protection challenge levelled against the de-
tainer statutes, it has been argued that the Supreme Court's speedy
trial decisions have made it clear that prison inmates accused of ad-
ditional offenses occupy a position with respect to prompt trial sim-
ilar to that occupied by other defendants. 223  Accordingly, classifica-
tion and different treatment of inmates and non-inmates is irrational
and amounts to invidious discrimination. The proposed statute
responds to the argument by treating all cases in a single statute, re-
quiring no demand for trial, and applying the same fixed time period
for trial to all prosecutions, irrespective of the defendant's status. The
statute does not expressly anticipate practical problems with cases in-
volving inmates, but leaves open the possibility of a reasonable continu-
ance in any case in which there is good cause for delay. 22 4 The result is
that the proposed statutory scheme recognizes that all criminal defend-
ants are similarly situated with respect to the legislative purpose-as-
suring prompt trial-and treats them accordingly.
statutes expressly exclude out-of-state prisoners from coverage while others have been
construed to do so. See note 139 supra. In a state in which ambiguity exists, the legis-
lature should amend the statute of limitations so as to bring out-of-state prisoners within
its protection.
223. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
224. It is worth noting that, if in practice courts consistently and with little or no
deliberation grant continuances in cases involving prisoners on the sole ground that prac-
tical problems result in delay, even the proposed statute may be subject to the charge
that it is unconstitutional as applied. Cf. Finney v. Wainwright, 434 F.2d 1001, 1003





The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, &e33
e* bese o i iH# 4 " Be~ts, ffcrm",ticnz o eefiplits, and difficul-
ties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdic-
tions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of
such charges eaa 4eii"ataeR othe pr-ae-e stati 4 aR aR4 al4 detai
e-re ba&o4 e a +1R i tenc " _iqaagine e !Ji~z The party
states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges a 4etaijjas,
when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the
absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agree-
ment to provide such cooperative procedures.
Article I:
-As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States of America; a terri-
tory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated
at the time that 4, iaitiae f -eqaest 4% -- dispestie-R piffsaa~t t&
4r-iele -14 ereei fei at the time thft a request for custody or availability is
initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on




(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indict-
ment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
ZD . WheR he h - 1edged a 4etaiae ead who is serving a term of impris-
onment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V(a)
hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or avail-
ability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is in-
carcerated: provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment,
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmit-
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ted -the request: and provided further that the--e &s4 be a pei-i44 4hify
dye a4ep reee4p by t-]e ae-ep,* e aiathe 44ffe the rheqel et 4e heR-
, edr wih4 whAiel pei4 the bge~ei~eF 4 the &effding &t"& fma-y 44lispp'e
4her equeet f mp y tmea e a-valabityy ei4e Ree -hi e W mI-
tiea &P ueR e 4e ti 4 the przieer [the provisions of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act -are complied with].
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's -written request as provided in para-
graph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody
shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the -tine re-
maining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the
time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole
agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish
all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who hafe
ledge4 iet seine [are known to have outstanding charges pending] against
the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing -them of the
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) T iespeet 4 a-y Preeei-g made eesAib by thie Ai4e pi
shi4 be oee withi 83 h-uRdred twelty 4fy 4 4h, e 4 4he
pse i!& the r-eeeiiia 4tey bet 4ef gee4 eause sheNwe in+ aeR eei+47
4he pr-seie e* h4i: eeueael hbe in eeateeeith~n ji-sit
4 the fmate may - &y .eeesary e- r- emenAe eotin-uaee.
(d) _Nehing eeatain&4 in th4i 4iele &hia be eeqetkue4 te. dep.pi* eey
ee 4 ftay 14&h' whieh he- Eay have t&. eeeRte the legality 4 hie
El e e pizeded in par-gpah (0 her'eof- but ae4 4eli~er may BeDt
be 4 e-P &B" e 4e g -teu4 that the e--eeative authiety 4 the
see state has net afirematvly eenseeated t-& f eo+dee4 & el+ de-
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint con-
templated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned -to the original place
of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, informa-
tion or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Article V:
(a) In response to a request made under Atiele 1 e- Article IV hereof,
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer -to deliver temporary
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order
-that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. 1- the r-eqaest F Lna4
&ipest0ea itq mae 4:fb thie prisee- the 4ee- 4 tempeiay eustedl shall ao-
eempan the N':Etee ete pei4ded ei iR Ai4iee 11 4 this ftgr-eement.
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In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving
state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by -this agreement or
to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever
custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state
into whose temporary custody the prisoner is -to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint
e the basis 4 whiel the dctaiRer- 4s beeR ledge4 e.e on the basis of which
the request for -temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) 14 t4e e ai'te e hrit-y she4 a4 eP te aeeef temeer-as
eus&- 4f wa4 tpe-seR, ee ii* t-e e*.e that a estieR er, the iRdietme,
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained
in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints wlhie4 4eez
the al sie 4 the 4etaii~e er deteaiie er opreseuse otiea eay e-the
ehaoge ei ehesges Tisi g eo 4 the same t Except for his at-
tendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which
his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or
other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with -the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to -the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time
being served on the sentence shall continue -to run but good time shall be
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice
of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other -than that for which temporary custody as pro-
vided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain
in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any
escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an
escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner per-
mitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pur-
suant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried in-
dictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being
had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of -trans-
porting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of
this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered
into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs
and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among
the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party
state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs,
or responsibilities therefor.
Article VI:
(a)-T1_+deeFaiaiB ;te 4u.aien aa4 eH&:4i da~eo 4 the 4hme
pe~r4ed jeqi44-e4 ia AT-ieles -1 a- V 4 thia tigTee~ae-Rt, te rnauig
4 4 im~e periefla 94a4i 43, teI4 wheae-Pe a34 fLep -e leffg fe *he j"ie
eee- ia uab~e 4& ste44 P4 , e detenm4e4 b : the eeur-t h& ig4edi
tieR 4 the matter-.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
Article Vii: (no change)
Article ViI: (no change)
Article IX: (no change)
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